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a b s t r a c t
This paper offers a historical overview of Einstein's vacillating attitude towards ‘phenomenological’ and
‘dynamical’ treatments of rods and clocks in relativity theory. In Einstein's view, a realistic microscopic
model of rods and clocks was needed to account for the very existence of measuring devices of identical
construction that always measure the same unit of time and the same unit of length. It will be shown that
the empirical meaningfulness of both relativity theories depends on what, following Max Born, one
might call the ‘principle of the physical identity of the units of measure’. In an attempt to justify the
validity of such a principle, Einstein was forced by different interlocutors, in particular Hermann Weyl
and Wolfgang Pauli, to deal with the genuine epistemological, rather than the physical question of
whether a theory should be required to describe the material devices needed for its own verification.
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Intrinsically, Brobdingnag and Lilliput are precisely the same;
it needs an intruding Gulliver—an extraneous standard of
length—to make them appear different.
A. S. Eddington
1. Introduction
In recent years, thanks mainly to Harvey Brown's seminal work
(for the most part collected in Brown (2005)), increasing attention
has been drawn to Einstein's ‘self-confessed sin’ of treating rods
and clocks as ‘primitive’, ‘self-sustained’, or ‘unstructured’ entities.
Brown rightly insisted that Einstein was aware that rods and
clocks are actually ‘structured dynamical entities’, ‘composite
bodies’, etc. the behavior of which depends on the structural
properties of the forces responsible for the microstructure of
matter. Therefore—as Einstein put it paradigmatically in his self-
written ‘obituary’ in a volume for the Library of Living Philoso-
phers edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp—the ‘sin’ of treating rods and
clocks as ultimate elements incapable of further explication should
not be ‘legalized’ (Einstein, 1949a, 59). It was a temporary
expedient, necessary only because physics at that time did not
possess the adequate conceptual tools to construct rods and clocks
explicitly from the fundamental physical quantities in the theory,
from fields alone, or in the worst case scenario, from fields and
particles together (Barbour, 2007, 587).
Einstein's vacillating attitude towards the role, indispensable or
provisional, of rods and clocks in both of his theories, has usually
been cast in the well-known opposition between constructive and
principle theories (Einstein, 1919b; see Howard (2005) for more
details). In Einstein's original ‘principle strategy’, the behavior of
rods and clocks was deduced from the postulates of the theory
encoded in the structure of space–time without introducing a
realistic microscopic model of their material constitution. How-
ever, it has been argued, if a suitable ‘constructive’ theory of
matter was eventually at hand, rods and clocks would be thought
of as rather complicated physical systems obeying fundamental
dynamical laws; the structure of space–time is nothing but an
effective codification of the symmetries of such laws.
The ambition of this paper is not to solve the vexed question of
the ‘arrow of explanation’ (Gorski, 2010) in relativity theory,
namely, whether it is the behavior of rods and clocks that explains
the space–time structure (Brown & Pooley, 2006), or if it is the
other way around (cf. e.g. Janssen (2009) and Norton (2008)).
Rather, it attempts to take a cue from this debate in order to offer
an overall historical survey of Einstein's concerns about a tension
between ‘phenomenological’ and ‘dynamical’ treatments of rods
and clocks. This paper will therefore follow as closely as possible
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the historical development (or rather, as we shall see, the surpris-
ing constancy) of Einstein's stance towards this issue in published
and unpublished writings.
In particular, this paper will document the context in which
Einstein, probably at the beginning of 1917, seems to have first
expressed, in his private correspondence, concerns about the use
of complicated material systems as measuring devices (Section 2).
It will consider the circumstances in which Einstein, in the 1920s,
when pressed by the epistemological objections raised by different
interlocutors—in particular Hermann Weyl (Scholz, 2007) and the
young Wolfgang Pauli (Stachel, 2005)—felt the urgency to articu-
late his point of view in public writings (Section 3). Thereby, he
outlined a two-stage epistemological strategy, vacillating between
a provisional and principled attitude toward the use of rods and
clocks in relativity theory (Section 4), to which he remained
faithful until the end of his life (Section 5). Even if other
interlocutors are worthy of consideration (in particular Arthur
Stanley Eddington), I have decided to concentrate on the German
debate, which, for obvious reasons, offers a particularly rich
dialogical network comprised of private correspondences, public
confrontations, and philosophical disputes (for the dialogical
approach to the history of science, cf. Beller (1999)).
Some of this material has been analyzed in some excellent
historical and philosophical literature (Fogel, 2008; Howard, 1994,
2007, 2014; Ryckman, 2005; Stachel, 1989, to mention a few).
However, as far I can see, there is no overall historical–critical
overview of Einstein's stance towards this issue over the years.
This is unfortunate, since the question of whether the behavior of
measuring devices should be derived from the theory equations
and not stipulated independently has often been discussed in the
recent philosophical debate by appealing to a limited group of
passages written by Einstein on disparate occasions.
As I will try to show, if inserted into the proper historical
setting, Einstein's dissatisfaction about his initial operational
treatment of rods and clocks, and his corresponding appeal to a
dynamical explanation, does not seem to ever actually address the
question in which the contemporary debate is most interested:
whether space–time lives a ‘parasitic’ existence at the expense of
the dynamical phenomena of the contraction of rods and the
dilation of clocks, or whether in a space–time formulation of
special relativity rods and clocks need not appear at all. In
particular, there is no textual evidence that Einstein ever argued
in favor of a dynamical explanation of rods and clocks in the
context of his opposition between constructive and principle
theories, so that constructive relativity would finally explain
dynamically what relativity as a principle theory had described
only kinematically.
It is undeniable that early on, Einstein expressed the conviction
that a dynamical account of rods and clocks was needed in both
special and general relativity. However, this was not meant to
explain rod contractions and clock dilations (cf. Janssen (2009,
39)). What needed to be explained dynamically was precisely the
opposite fact that, to put it somewhat provocatively, there exist
clocks that do not slow down and rods that do not shorten in any
circumstances. More precisely, in both special and general relativ-
ity, it is more or less tacitly assumed that identically constructed
rods and identically constructed clocks, which measure respectively
the same length and show the same rate of ticking when they are
held side by side at one location at a certain time, will always
agree on their readings if carefully placed next to each other while
at rest again, whatever their intermediate histories may have been.
In other words, a dynamical explanation should account for the
very existence of good rods and clocks of identical construction
that always measure the same true proper time and proper length,
whatever may have happened to them in the past (Bacelar
Valente, 2013).
Relativity theory neither provides any clues for assuming that
physical systems with these characteristics really exist in nature,
nor does it tell us how to recognize and identify them if they did.
Rather, one must proceed to a tentative and provisional identifica-
tion. For instance, experience furnishes sufficient reasons to regard
two atoms of the same substance as identical clocks. After it has
been ‘stipulated’ that atoms could play the role of good clocks (i.e.,
that the frequency of an atom is always its proper frequency), then
it is expected that these systems should behave according to the
predictions of the theory. In this sense the theory is said to be
empirically testable. In particular, if we compare the rates of two
identical atomic clocks moving with respect to one another,
special relativity predicts that we should observe the transverse
Doppler effect; similarly, if we compare the rates of two identical
atomic clocks moving along different trajectories in a gravitational
field, according to general relativity we should expect to observe
the gravitational redshift.
However, it is also clear that these two effects are taken to be
an empirical confirmation of the time dilation effects predicted by
the theory, only if the assumption is granted that two atoms of the
same substance are identical clocks, which, if held side by side in
relative rest, always reliably measure the same proper time. The
problem emerges when one realizes that such material devices are
rather complicated physical systems, which behave in conformity
to some dynamical laws. Without an adequate knowledge of such
laws, there is no way to tell in advance if a given clock is in fact an
ideal clock, whose functioning is not significantly affected by the
presence of accelerations, electromagnetic fields, or by the grav-
itational field itself. Thus, it can be objected that what we actually
compare with experience is not simply the predicted ‘geometrical’
effect of time dilation, but the latter together with the physical
laws governing the natural process that we have chosen as a clock.
In this sense, Einstein expressed early on the conviction that in
relativity theory, as in any physical theory, one seems to be
entitled to expect a dynamical explanation of how the measuring
instruments work, possibly without calling on other branches of
physics (Butterfield, 2002). The initial ‘black-boxing’ of rods and
clocks as unstructured entities was only a provisional compromise,
and though probably unavoidable, it was a ‘sin’ that should not be
forgiven. In principle, the dynamics of both rods and clocks, and
the other physical systems, should be describable within the
framework of relativity theory. As we shall see, however, what
requires a dynamical explanation is not the physical process of,
say, the slowing down of clocks, but the very existence of
identically constructed (gleich beschaffene) clocks that always
measure the same true proper time in every circumstance.
In my opinion, in order to properly appreciate this point, which
has sometimes been misunderstood in the current philosophical
debate, it is important to realize that the entire discussion of the
role of rods and clocks in relativity theory turned on a tacit, but
fundamental assumption. Max Born once aptly called it (although
only in passing and only referring to special relativity), ‘the
principle of the physical identity of the units of measure’ (Born,
1920, 191; my emphasis; tr. Born, 1922, 211). The importance of
such a principle, in spite of some illuminating works on this issue
(Pierseaux, 2003; see also Pierseaux (1999)), has not been suffi-
ciently recognized in the philosophical literature (Brown mentions
it, but only in a footnote; Brown, 2005, 81, fn. 41; see also
Valentini, 2008, 135–136). However, I would dare to claim that
the fate of special and general relativity as physical theories—and
not only as the mathematical manipulation of quantities—depends
entirely on the validity of such a principle, and should thus be
considered one of the central issues, if not the central issue of the
epistemology of relativistic geometry. In order to make relativity
theory physically meaningful, we have to assume the actual
existence in nature of physical processes, permitted by some
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physical laws, which can be used to define and reproduce the units
of length and time at different space–time points.
Thus, the epistemological question emerges of whether a
theory should be able to describe material objects and processes
that serve as its means of verification, a position shared by most
relativists, or whether such a description should lie outside the
domain theory, a position that, as can easily be guessed, prevailed
among physicists working on quantum mechanics (cf. e.g. Peres
and Zurek (1982)). Einstein's vacillation between ‘phenomenolo-
gical’ and ‘dynamical’ treatments of rods and clocks should be seen
as the attempt to position himself between these two extremes,
which can be considered as paradigmatically incarnated by Weyl
and Pauli. The real meaning of Einstein's arguments, as often
happens in the history of science, can only be understood when
one realizes they were formulated in response to certain inter-
locutors (Beller, 1999). From this point of view, Einstein's unease
about the treatment of rods and clocks as unstructured entities is
extraneous to the concerns of the supporters of ‘Lorentzian
pedagogy’ in special or general relativity, as well as to those of
their opponents. Rather, Einstein's unease should be understood
against the background of a truly philosophical question, which—
to use his own rhetorical hyperbole—is nothing but ‘Pilate's
famous question: ‘What is truth?’’ (Einstein, 1949b, 676).
2. 1917–1920. Einstein on rods and clocks in private
correspondence
Responding to his former student, W. Dällenbach, at the beginning
of 1917, Einstein was ready to admit in private correspondence that
his treatment of material rods and ideal clocks as unstructured
entities was a provisional compromise, which would later be elimi-
nated when a suitable theory of their material structure was found.
In the years immediately following, Einstein was forced to further
articulate his epistemological standpoint when pressed by the com-
peting objections of Weyl and the young Pauli.
2.1. Einstein's 1917 letter to Dällenbach
In a letter dated 31 October 1916, Einstein made a passing
remark to his friend Michele Besso which, in subsequent years,
would engender turned out to be a matter of considerable debate:
‘Your comment about the equivalence of physic[ally] different
measuring rods and clocks (and subjected to different prehistories)
is fully correct.’ However, Einstein points out, ‘this assumption also
tacitly plays a role in Galilei–Newton's theory’ (Einstein to Besso,
31 October 1916, CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 270, 349, my emphasis).
Judging from the tone of this passage, Einstein seemed to consider
this hypothesis sufficiently natural (even though, as we shall see,
the existence of such ‘ahistoric’ objects is rather implausible in the
classical framework), and not worthy of being addressed explicitly.
The physical significance of our measurements arises from the fact
that, if we measure distances and time intervals with equivalently-
constructed instruments, we obtain results that, within a certain
experimental imprecision, are equivalent and do not depend on
the prehistories of such instruments.
In pre-general-relativistic theories, rods and clocks are used to
directly measure coordinate differences (at least in those coordi-
nate systems for which the laws assume their simplest form),
assuring their physical significance. A ‘body of reference’ can in
principle be physically constructed as a cubic grid made of
rigid rods at relative rest with clocks at the nodes, synchronized
using light rays (cf. e.g., Einstein, 1905, 892; Einstein, 1907b, 437).
In general relativity, devices measuring space–time are not to be
admitted as the physical counterparts of the ‘coordinate distances’,
which are no longer physically-observable quantities. Still, it is
assumed that the so-called line element ds2 has a ‘natural’ distance
—a definite, experimentally-determinable value (up to a constant
which can be set¼1), that can be directly measured with ‘trans-
portable’ rods and clocks that always measure the same velocity of
light c in vacuo (Einstein, 1913, 494).1
Concretely, to measure the magnitude of the ds2, we might use,
say, a rock salt crystal as a rod and a cadmium atom emitting its
red line as a clock. We can arbitrarily choose a certain number of
spacings between the atoms of the crystal as a unit of length, or
number of wave crests emitted by the radiating atom as a unit of
time. It is tacitly assumed that the ratio of such units is an absolute
constant,2 which is not affected by the gravitational field (i.e., more
precisely, it does not depend on the second derivatives of the gμυ),
3
and possibly by other external influences (in particular the pre-
sence of an electromagnetic field).
As we shall see, choosing this kind of physical system is not a
casual decision. There was overwhelming spectroscopic evidence,
in spite of the missing theoretical explanation (Bohr, 1913a, 1913b,
1913c), that atoms of the same kind are absolutely identical; the
same astonishing identity is shown by the atomic lattices of the
crystal of a given substance, as revealed by X-ray diffraction (Born,
1915; Laue, Friedrich, & Knipping, 1913). Such physical systems
might therefore adequately play the role of ‘identically con-
structed’ rods and clocks, which can be used to reproduce identical
units of measure at the remotest places and times, and thus to
physically normalize the ds2 as the unit interval.
At the same time, the use of atoms or crystalline structures as
clocks and rods makes it intuitively clear that these measuring
devices are not unstructured physical systems. Precisely for this
reason, sometime after 15 February 1917, Einstein had to admit to
his former Zurich student, Walter Dällenbach, that from an
epistemological point of view, the idea that the ds2 could be found
directly through a measurement done by rigid rods was at most a
provisional compromise similar to the ‘ponderomotive’ definition
of the electromagnetic field strengths, in which the electric force is
defined as something that causes the motion of an electric charge,
and in turn, an electric charge is something that exerts electric
force:
Dear Dällenbach!
Your remarks are, in my opinion, to a large extent correct.4
Strictly speaking, the concept of ds2 evaporates in an empty
abstraction: ds2 cannot be rigorously considered as the result of
measurements, not even in the absence of electromagnetic
fields. You have rightly indicated the reasons why it is so.
Nevertheless, in a didactically reasonable presentation of the
theory the ds2 must be so considered, as if it were rigorously
measurable. The issue here is analogous to that in electrical
science, where the definitions for e and h are given, even
though these definitions do not withstand strict criticism.
A logically satisfying presentation can be achieved (a posteriori),
so that a single, more complex solution is related to the observed
facts. A measuring-rod would then be an atomic system of a certain
type that does not play any special role in the theory. Thus a four-
dimensional continuum can still be maintained and, in uphold-
ing the postulate of general covariance, it then has the advantage
1 As Einstein points out in a footnote of the latter writing: ‘We will make the
assumption that this is achievable at all locations and at all times’ (Einstein, 1913,
490, n. 1). Einstein justifies this assumption by appealing to the equivalence
principle: the outcome of any local experiment (in a freely-falling laboratory) is
independent of its location in space–time.
2 I borrow this from Flamm (1916, 451), who makes this presupposition of
general relativity particularly clear.
3 For sake of historical accuracy, I have adhered, as far as possible, to the
original notation.
4 Einstein refers to a private conversation.
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of circumventing the arbitrariness in the choice of coordinates
(Einstein to Dällenbach, after 15 February 1917, CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc.
299, 391; my emphasis).
Surprisingly enough, this early passage contains the ambivalent
stance on rods and clocks that Einstein would consistently defend
until the end of his life. Measuring rods and clocks are made of
ordinary matter, that is, they are constructed of particles kept
together by non-gravitational forces, which at that time meant
electromagnetic interactions. The description of their behavior
inevitably implies the comparison of the forces that are internal to
rods and clocks with those that are external. Such considerations
ultimately depend on a theory of the electromagnetic interactions
involved in material structure. The length of a crystal and the rate
of an atomic clock might be affected by a strong variable electro-
magnetic field. But also, in the absence of electromagnetic effects,
Einstein points out, ‘we obviously do not know whether the
[gravitational] field forces […] or acceleration, do not (in principle)
affect the yardsticks and clocks directly’ (Einstein to Dällenbach,
after 15 February 1917, CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 299, 392).
Einstein's initial treatment of rods and clocks, which made it
necessary to introduce them as separate entities in the framework
of his theory, was thus a logical defect that ought to be eliminated,
even though he had just defended this point of view at length in
his popular book on relativity, finished at the end of 1916 (Einstein,
1917a). In general, Einstein seems to have been convinced that a
satisfactory theory should not simply postulate the existence of
the material structures suitable to be used as measuring devices,
but rather, it should deduce it. If possible, this should be done
without abandoning the field-theoretical framework of general
relativity. Then rods and clocks would not play ‘any special role in
the theory’, as opposed to all other physical objects.
However, in Einstein's theory, the role of matter as the source
of the gravitational field was an external ingredient not deter-
mined by the theory, but rather was something to be prescribed
independently, leaving open the question of whether the theories
of the electromagnetic field alone, or possibly the electromagnetic
field and the gravitational field together, would form a sufficient
basis for a theory of matter.5 After some initial doubt (Einstein,
1916a), the letter to Dällenbach shows that Einstein began to
nurture some hope that general relativity might constitute the
starting point for building a field theory of matter; however, he
was open (Stachel, 1993) to considering an atomistic alternative,
that is, to drop the ‘continuum’ and along with it, the principle of
general covariance. Einstein offered to Dällenbach a balanced
analysis, pro and con, of both points of view:
However, you have also understood correctly the disadvantage
attached to a continuum. If the molecular interpretation of
matter is the correct (practicable) one, that is, if a portion of the
world must be represented as a finite number of moving points,
then the continuum in modern theory contains way too many
possibilities. […] Indeed, I see fundamental difficulties here
[abandoning the continuum] as well. Electrons (as points)
would be final conditions (building blocks) in such a system.
Do final building blocks exist at all? Why are they all similar in
size? Is it adequate to say: God in His wisdom has made them
all the same size, each like any of the others, because He so
wished? If it had suited Him, He could also have made them
dissimilar. Thus we are better placed with the continuum
conception, because elementary building blocks do not have
to be provided from the outset (Einstein to Dällenbach, after 15
February 1917, CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 299, 392; my emphasis).
Thus, even if Einstein left open the possibility of a ‘molecular
interpretation of matter’, where electrons are final ‘building
blocks’, he seemed to be cautiously inclined to search for a
continuum theory in which the ultimate constituents of matter,
the electrons or ions, would be treated as ‘solutions’ to some non-
linear field equations.6 In this context, it would then be possible to
find some ‘more complex solutions’ of such equations that would
present characteristics making them suitable to be used as rods
and clocks. Rods and clocks would not be introduced ‘by hand’, but
would be treated as a physical system like any other. In a possible
general-relativistic theory of matter, the dynamics of both rods
and clocks and all other material systems would then be described
by the same theory.
As we shall see, this would raise the question of how the theory
would be related to reality, that is, in which sense we could claim
that the prediction made by the theory, e.g., about the values of
the gμυ, could be said to be ‘verified’ or ‘falsified’ by observing the
behavior of rods and clocks. Although Einstein had addressed a
similar issue previously, at least in passing,7 in the following years
he was forced to respond to this problem in a more systematic way
(Hentschel, 1992a).
2.2. Rods and clocks in the first edition of Weyl's Raum, Zeit, Materie
The letter to Dällenbach provides significant textual evidence, the
importance of which, as far I can see, has not been sufficiently
emphasized in the literature.8 Here, Einstein's position on the role of
rod- and clock-like material systems in relativity theory was already
clearly defined in all its essential elements, along with his stance
5 Einstein's theory was consciously formulated regardless of “specific assump-
tions about the constitution of matter” (Einstein, 1916b, 810), that is, of everything
that is not the gravitational field, including the electromagnetic field. In particular,
Einstein rejected the “unfounded hypotheses about the structure of the electron or
matter” (Einstein to Weyl, 23 November 1916, CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 278, 365) that had
motivated Hilbert's theory. Hilbert had in fact attempted, along the lines of Gustav
Mie's thinking, to use general relativity to construct a theory of matter, explaining
“hitherto hidden processes in the interior of atoms” (Hilbert, 2009; Hilbert, 1915,
407). One can find here the model of a theory from which the properties of atomic
systems can be deduced, that in turn can be used as clocks. Referring to the fact
that an atom always measures the proper time dτ. Hilbert pointed out that, “this
assumption has only a provisional character”; when physics is finally “fully
developed, then the axiom must appear as a consequence of the general theory”
(Hilbert, 1916/1917, 284; my emphasis).
6 Already in January 1908, Einstein expressed his concern about the fact that
Maxwell–Lorentz electrodynamics had to postulate the existence of electrons and
their laws of motion separately. He argued that, “in my opinion a satisfying theory
should so be constructed that the electron appears as a solution” (Einstein to
Sommerfeld, 14 January 1908, CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 73, 88). Starting in 1909, Einstein
attempted to formulate a nonlinear theory of the electromagnetic field, hoping to
derive the atomistic properties of both radiation (light quanta) and matter, so that
the electron would cease to be “a stranger in Maxwell–Lorentz Electrodynamics”
(Einstein, 1909a, 192; see also Einstein (1909b)). In particular, in order to derive the
existence of electrons of the same mass and charge, he came to recognize that it
was sufficient to include in his equations some constant with dimensions of a
length (cf. McCormmach (1970) for more details).
7 Already in 1910/1011—in the lecture notes for a course on electricity and
magnetism at the University of Zurich—Einstein seems to have argued, referring to
the question of the definition of field strength via unit charge, that the idea of a
physical theory should not be regarded as “a conceptual system whose individual
parts” might “correspond immediately to experiential facts” (CPAE, Vol. 3, Doc. 11,
325[p. 12]; my emphasis), but as a theoretical construction that “is true or false, i.e.,
corresponding or not corresponding to experience, only as a whole” (CPAE, Vol. 3,
Doc. 11, 325[p. 13]; tr. in Howard, 1994, 91–92). As Don Howard showed in a classic
paper (Howard, 1990), this attitude might show the influence of Pierre Duhem (cf.
also Howard, 2014, 360). See also Footnote 15. In the following, it will become
progressively clearer that the whole discussion on the role of rods and clocks in
relativity theory should be understood against the background of this opposition
between ‘individual parts’ vs. a ‘whole system’, rather than between principle vs.
constructive theories.
8 It is, for instance, never mentioned in the otherwise very careful reconstruc-
tions provided by Fogel (2008) and Ryckman (2005). Stachel (1993) analyzes the
letter but only considers Einstein's stance toward the continuum/discontinuum
alternative.
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toward the possibility of developing a relativistic theory of matter.
In particular, we can already see here that the key to reconciling
Einstein's more careful stance with his repeated emphasis on the
ideal of ‘geometry as a branch of physics’ concerning the behavior of
physical rods and clocks, was to emphasize the ‘provisional’ aspect of
the latter view (cf. Howard (2005)). As I will try to show, Einstein was
later forced by various interlocutors to publicly address this issue,
mainly in semi-popular writings. However, he would never change
his stance towards it.
It could be significant that the letter was written to Dällenbach.
Since 1916, he had been working on his doctoral dissertation at the
ETH Zurich on a generally covariant extension of Lorentz electro-
dynamics (see below in Section 2.3) under the guidance of the
mathematician Hermann Weyl. Returning from the war, Weyl had
immersed himself in the study of Einstein's theory (Weyl, 1917;
cf. Weyl (1955), for Weyl's later recollections). Dällenbach's objec-
tion to Einstein possibly reflects discussions he may have had with
Weyl himself. In fact, during the summer term of 1917, Weyl gave a
series of lectures on Einstein's theory, which would be published a
year later as Raum, Zeit, Materie (Weyl, 1918a), destined to become
one the first and most influential books on relativity. Here, Weyl
expressed his reservations about Einstein's treatment of rods and
clocks as unstructured entities in special relativity.
Weyl seems to have believed that special relativity could make
predictions about the behavior of unaccelerated clocks and rods
without a detailed knowledge of the dynamical laws governing
their behavior, but only by assuming the Lorentz-invariance of
such laws. However, he explicitly pointed out that such ‘agnosti-
cism’ is no longer allowed when the dynamical systems that we
use as rods and clocks undergo acceleration. However, the
assumption of the existence of ‘memoryless’ rods and clocks that
are not influenced by their previous accelerations is essential to
providing the theory with empirical content.
As Weyl shows, in order to ensure that the global scaling factor
of the Lorentz transformations is the unity (cf. Weyl (1923, 171),
for more details), special relativity had to assume that ‘the static
length of a measuring rod’ and the ‘‘proper time’ of the clock’
(Weyl, 1918a, 138; Weyl, 1922a, 176) are the same in all inertial
systems. However, there is no other way to determine the equality
of lengths or intervals with respect to different inertial frames
without accelerating a rigid rod or ideal clock from one frame to
another. Thus, an independent assumption is necessary: if one
slowed down the rods and clocks again and placed them next to
physically identical ones that rest in the new inertial system, there
would be no difference in length and ticking rate.9 In Weyl's own
words:
We require of a rigid body that is to be used for purposes of
measurement (in particular, a linear measuring rod) that, after
coming to rest in an allowable system of reference, it shall
always remain exactly the same as before, that is, that it shall
have the same stationary measures (or stationary length); and we
require of a clock that goes correctly that it shall always have
the same proper-time when it has come to rest (as a whole) in
an allowable system of reference. We may assume that the
measuring rods and clocks which we shall use satisfy this
condition to a sufficient degree of approximation. […] The
limits of acceleration within which this assumption may be
made without appreciable errors arising are certainly very
wide. Definite and exact statements about this point can be made
only when we have built up a dynamics based on physical and
mechanical laws (Weyl, 1918a, 138–139; Weyl, 1922a, 176; my
emphasis).
According to Weyl, the existence of rods and clocks, which are
not influenced by the accelerations they may have been subjected
to, can be accepted with a reasonable confidence under suitable
circumstances. However, strictly speaking this assumption cannot
be fully justified without relying on the detailed knowledge of
internal dynamics of the physical systems that we use as space–
time measuring devices.
The very notion of a rigid body preserving the same length,
Weyl explains, is rather problematic in special relativity.10 In
particular, no body can remain rigid while being continuously
accelerated to another ‘allowable’ system; if we push the body at
the same moment at different points, the motion will only
gradually be communicated to the whole body, since no signals
with arbitrarily high velocities are allowed. Hence, in special
relativity, ‘no body exists which remains objectively always the
same no matter what influences it has been subjected to’ (Weyl,
1918a, 138; my emphasis; Weyl, 1922a, 176); we can speak at most
of the ‘rigid motion’ of a non-rigid body. The rigid motion of an
extended body is achieved by careful application of forces to
different parts of the body; thus its transfer from one inertial
system to another cannot be discussed without entering into
dynamical considerations, based on some model of the body and
of the effects of acceleration on its shape.
We are in no better position when we consider the behavior of
ideal clocks, even if the difficulties due to their spatial extension
can be neglected. The claim that a clock records the passage of
proper time
R
ds along its trajectory is equivalent to what Arnold
Sommerfeld has called the ‘(unprovable) assumption’ (in
Blumenthal (1913, 71)) that one can ignore the effects of accel-
eration on its internal workings (cf. Arthur (2010)). More precisely,
such an assumption depends on our knowledge of the physical
constitution of the clock. Mechanical clocks—pendulums or bal-
ance wheels—might not be very resistant to strong accelerations
(such as smashing them against an obstacle); even an atomic clock
accelerated by means of a strong electric field might be ionized
and thus stop working as a clock.11
According to Weyl, without any detailed knowledge of the
internal constitutive arrangement of the material structure of rigid
rods and clocks, it is only possible to make a reasonably plausible
guess, valid only for quasi-stationary motions, that is, for slow
9 Einstein explicitly pointed this issue out in a footnote of his 1907 Jahrbuch-
paper, after having discussed the problem of the global scale factor in the Lorentz
transformations (Einstein, 1907b, 419–420): “[t]his conclusion is based on the
physical assumption that the length of a measuring rod or the rate of a clock do not
undergo any permanent changes if these objects are set in motion and then
brought to rest again” (Einstein, 1907b, 420, fn. 1; my emphasis; see also Einstein
(1910, 156, fn. 2) and Einstein (1911b, V)). Einstein had to assume that the influence
of acceleration on rods and clocks “may be neglected” (Einstein, 1907b, 455), so that
their lengths and ticking rates do not depend on the “prehistory of their motion”
(Einstein, 1907b, 429, fn. 1). Under this assumption, it is possible to use the same
measuring rod and the same clock in different inertial systems (cf. also Lorentz
(1910)). Brown famously labeled this assumption the ‘boostability’ of rods and
clocks (Brown, 2005, 30, 81, 121).
10 As is well known, this was shown by Born (1909), whose definition of
rigidity (the so-called ‘Born rigidity’) was later taken up by Ehrenfest (1909),
Herglotz (1910), Laue (1911) and Noether (1910). Einstein never directly partici-
pated in the discussion, which, however, might have played a relevant role in
forcing him to abandon the notion of a rigid ‘body of reference’ (Maltese & Orlando,
1995; Stachel, 1989).
11 After a talk in Zurich in 1911, Einstein (1911a) confessed that, ‘according to
the theory of relativity we do not know what happens’ (Einstein, 1911b, V) to an
accelerated clock (on this point cf. Brown (2009)). We can, for instance, imagine it
moving along approximate polygonal path composed of n successive small linear
paths in which it moves in uniform motion. However, “[t]he sudden change of
direction could produce an immediate change in the positions of the hands of the
clock [Uhrzeigerstellung]” (Einstein, 1911b, V). Thus, Einstein limited his considera-
tions to very slow accelerations: ‘the influence of such sudden change should
recede the longer the clock […] moves uniformly, i.e. the bigger the dimensions of
the polygon are’ (Einstein, 1911b, V). Cf. also Einstein's 1912–1914 review of
electrodynamics, CPAE, Vol. 4, Doc. 1, 46[p. 29-30].
M. Giovanelli / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 48 (2014) 20–4424
accelerations. In good conscience nothing can be asserted about
what happens during arbitrary acceleration. In this sense Weyl
speaks of an ‘adiabaticity’ assumption analogous to slow processes
in thermodynamics. When a gas is warmed sufficiently slowly
(strictly speaking, infinitely slowly), it will pass through a series of
thermodynamic states of equilibrium; similarly, ‘only when we
move the measuring rods and clocks steadily, without jerks, will
they preserve their static lengths and proper-times’ (Weyl, 1918a,
138; Weyl, 1922a, 177).
Summarizing, Weyl is making a simple point here upon which,
later, most relativists would substantially agree. In special relativ-
ity, coordinate differences are said to be measured by means of
rigid rods and clocks. However, in doing so we actually use certain
concrete physical processes governed by dynamical laws. Only the
knowledge of such laws would allow an explanation of the proper
behavior of rods and clocks, removing the need to postulate it. In
particular, Weyl makes it clear that what has to be explained
dynamically is not only the resistance to acceleration of individual
rods and clocks, but the very existence of a class of rods and clocks
of identical construction, which remain physically the same despite
the influences they were subjected to. This is the fundamental
condition of the experimental testability of the theory.
It is in fact precisely because ‘a sodium-molecule which is at
rest in an allowable system remains objectively the same’, that we
can predict that ‘ν0, the frequency of a sodium-molecule moving
with a velocity v’, will differ by a Lorentz factor from ‘the
frequency ν of a sodium-molecule which is at rest’, if ‘both
frequencies are observed in a spectroscope which is at rest’ (Weyl,
1918a, 146; my emphasis; Weyl, 1922a, 185). Then, if we compare
the rates of two identical atomic clocks that are moving with
respect to one another with the help of light signals, we might
observe (or not) a time dilation effect predicted by the theory.
However, this comparison is only meaningful under the assump-
tion that, if the two atoms were carefully slowed down and put
next to each other they would always tick at the same rate.12
If the existence of physical systems with such characteristics is
well supported by empirical evidence, it would be preferable to
have some special-relativistic theory of matter that admits certain
discrete solutions of a special character, such as static or periodic
solutions, that make them suitable to be used as rods and clocks.
However, Weyl points out, ‘the Maxwell–Lorentz theory’, the most
immediate candidate for a matter theory, being linear, is incapable
of solving ‘the problem of matter’ (Weyl, 1918a, 162; Weyl, 1922a,
203; slightly modified), that is, to account for the existence of
electrons, which have a definite invariable mass, and, in addition,
a definite invariable charge.
In particular, it is incomprehensible why the separate parts of
the negative or positive charge do not repel each other, without
introducing some non-electromagnetic force exerting a ‘cohesive
pressure’ (Weyl, 1918a, 160, 162; Weyl, 1922a, 200, 208) of
tremendous strength (Poincaré, 1906). Thus the electrons are
treated ‘as something given a priori as a foreign body to the field’
(Weyl, 1918a, 165; Weyl, 1922a, 206). Weyl did not hide his (clearly
too optimistic) hope that it was possible to build a ‘purely
dynamical view of matter’, à la Gustav Mie (Mie, 1912a, 1912b,
1913), in which matter would turn out to be an ‘offspring of the
field’, rather than ‘its carrier’ (Weyl, 1918a, 162; Weyl, 1922a, 203).
Atoms and electrons would not be regarded as ‘ultimate invariable
elements’ (Weyl, 1918a, 162; Weyl, 1922a, 203), but as stable
‘knots’, particle-like solutions of some set of Lorentz-covariant
non-linear partial differential equations (cf. Scholz (2006), for
more details).
Weyl nurtured some hope that such a theory would explain the
existence and properties of electrons in electromagnetic terms,
and indirectly, those of atoms. In this way one would also be able
to account for the stability of atomic spectra that one can use as
clocks, or the distribution of atom patterns in a rigid crystalline
structure that one can use as rods. However, in the absence of any
reliable relativistic theory of matter that would assure the exis-
tence of localized stable structures suitable to become space–time
measuring devices, Weyl was more inclined to avoid the use of
rods and clocks as measuring instruments altogether. ‘Since the
behavior of rods and clocks is to some extent problematic for the
establishment of physical laws’ (Weyl, 1918a, 139), one may make
use of less structured entities and derive the metric structure (up
to the choice of a unit of measure) from the observation of light
rays and free-falling particles alone (provided certain global
assumptions about the entire space–time are added); such mea-
suring devices could be described within the framework of special
relativity, or by the available special-relativistic field theories, such
as Maxwell electrodynamics (cf. Weyl (1918a, 139–140)).
Thus, in the first edition of his book, Weyl had already sketched
the main lines of an epistemological ideal to which he would
remain faithful until the end of this life (for an excellent
philosophically-oriented overview of Weyl's work, see Bell and
Korté (2014)). A theory, according to Weyl, should in principle
avoid the use of measuring devices, the behavior of which is
extraneous to the framework of the theory (see below, Section
5.3). It is, after all, the theory that tells us which physical objects,
should they exist, can be used as suitable measuring devices. For
instance, our knowledge of the electric field is admittedly only
inferred from the behavior of matter, which is the only seat of
charge (cf. Weyl (1918a, 60)). In particular, we define the electric
field strength in terms of the ‘ponderomotive’ force on the unit
charge. However—Weyl would use this example again and again in
his epistemological writings—this definition can be regarded only
as a provisional starting point. It is sufficient to consider the fact
that we can empirically determine the charge of the test body only
by observing the curvature of its path in an electric field, as
determined by the Lorentz force law. Thus we have to know the
momentum of the charged body at any given time, as well as the
strength of the electric field, to calculate its charge.
In general, Weyl insists, it does not make sense to ‘test a single
law detached from this theoretical fabric [Gefüge]’ (Weyl, 1918a,
60; Weyl, 1922a, 67). We need a ‘whole network of theoretical
considerations to arrive at an experimental means of verification’
that constitutes a self-supporting system of cross-references: only
this ‘inseparable theoretical whole’ (Weyl, 1918a, 60; Weyl, 1922a,
67) can be meaningfully confronted with experience. Needless to
say, Weyl took the same attitude towards the role of the behavior
of rods and clocks in general relativity. A proper description of
their behavior would require not only Einstein's gravitational-
geometric theory, but a theory of matter as well—which, however,
general relativity was unable to provide.
So, for instance, one could consider general relativity as
empirically adequate, because the predicted redshift of solar atoms
is observed. The gravitational redshift again presupposes, however,
that two ‘sodium atoms at rest’, those placed in the photosphere
of the sun, and the ones on the earth, ‘are objectively fully
alike’ (Weyl, 1918a, 197; my emphasis; Weyl, 1922a, 246). That is,
12 The use of quantum mechanical systems (moving positive ions) as fast
moving clocks was suggested by Einstein (1907a). The reason for this choice (beside
the fact that ions in canal rays move very fast) was that we can reasonably assume
all ions are identical, so that their spectral lines as measured by a co-moving
spectrograph are always the same. Then we can consider such an ion as a clock of
definite frequency; “this frequency is given, for example, by the light emitted by
identically constituted ions at rest with respect to the observer” (Einstein, 1907b, 422;
my emphasis). It is worth emphasizing Einstein's claim that ions can be interpreted
as ‘identically constructed’ clocks. Eddington (1918) makes particularly clear that
the dimensions of hydrogen atoms at rest are assumed to be the same in all inertial
systems. This assures the correspondence of the measuring units in different
frames.
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they must emit the same number of wave crests in a given time
(if measured by a spectrograph relatively at rest). However, the
very existence of identical atoms is not intelligible from the point
of view of general relativity, which, like special relativity relies on
a merely phenomenological theory of matter ‘in which the atomic
fine structure of matter is disregarded’ (Weyl, 1918a, 216).
Due to the impossibility of providing a general-relativistic
theory of matter that accounts for the existence of the very
structures we use as rods and clocks, Weyl insisted again that it
would be more accurate to use testing procedures that involve less
dynamical theory. In particular, Weyl initially believed that in
general relativity, light signals would suffice to determine the
geometry of space–time. Two gik-systems that agree on light rays
would determine the same space–time geometry up to a constant
λ: ‘the arbitrary remaining proportionality factor can only be
determined through the individual choice of a unit of measure’
(Weyl, 1918a, 183). After this arbitrary choice has been made once
and for all, it is possible to assign specific values to time and space
intervals.13
2.3. Weyl's theory and the Einstein–Weyl correspondence
As Weyl would later recall (Weyl, 1946), it was during the 1917
lectures on relativity when he realized that the assumption of the
constancy of the scale factor λ—and thus of the global availability
of the units of length and time—was only a contingent feature of
the Riemannian geometry adopted by general relativity, an
assumption that in principle could be dropped. Following mainly
Levi-Civita (1916), Weyl interpreted the length ds of two adjacent
events as an infinitesimal vector in space–time, whose compo-
nents are the coordinate-differentials dxi of its end points. In
Riemannian geometry, in the general case, a vector transported
without changing its components (i.e. parallel-transported)
around a loop returns to its original position with the same length
but a different direction (non-integrability of direction); Weyl
realized that a coherent non-Riemannian geometry might be
built in which such an asymmetry between length and direction
is avoided (non-integrability of length; for more details cf. e.g.,
Bell and Korté (2014, 4.1.3), Ryckman (2005, sec. 6.4), Scholz (1994)
and Vizgin (1994, ch. 3).
Weyl sent the drafts of his book to Einstein on 1 March 1918,
also announcing a 10-page paper, in which he suggested that, by
removing such asymmetry between the length and direction of a
vector (Afriat, 2009), one could formulate a theory unifying
gravitation and the other known non-gravitational interaction,
electromagnetism (CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 472). The non-integrability of
direction would account for gravitation, and the non-integrability
of length for electromagnetism. In dropping the comparability of
lengths at different points, not only the 10 components of the
metric tensor gik, but also the four quantities φi appear, which
happen to behave like the potentials of the electromagnetic field.
Moreover, Weyl had clearly hoped to find an explanation for ‘the
existence of the electron and the peculiarities of the hitherto
unexplained processes in the atom that could be deduced from the
theory’ (Weyl, 1918b, 1968, 477–478; tr. O’Raifeartaigh, 1997, 34),
and with them the existence of bulky material structures.
When Einstein received the draft of the paper on 6 April 1918,
he was famously impressed by Weyl's ‘stroke of genius’. However,
he confessed he was incapable of overcoming what he labeled the
‘measuring rods objection’ against the theory, which he should
have communicated to Weyl in person during a stay in Zurich in
late March (cf. CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 498, 710). The well-known
objection runs roughly as follows.
Einstein immediately attributed a concrete physical meaning to
the magnitude of a time-like vector ds connecting two adjacent
events: it is the time recorded by a clock (some physical system
running periodically), carried by a particle that includes those two
events in its history. Put this way, Weyl's theory would predict that
the ratio of the rates at which any two physical clocks tick is not
constant, but is affected by the electromagnetic potentials φυ they
have encountered. A clock would measure its proper time
R
ds in
absence of an electromagnetic field but it would measure
R
φυdxν
(where φυ is a function of position) if it has been placed for a long
time, say, in a charged metallic box. In this way, however, the rate
of the clocks' ticking would depend on the physical circumstances
they have encountered in the past. The equality of two line
elements, ds1 and ds2 (in Einstein's notation), would not be
‘physically’ definable in a univocal way. As a consequence—as
Einstein wrote to Weyl on April 1918—‘Rel. Theory would fully lose
its empirical basis’ (Einstein to Weyl, 15 April 1918, CPAE, Vol. 8,
Doc. 507, 721).
Since the Prussian Academy only agreed to publish Weyl's
paper together with Einstein's objection, Einstein attached to a
letter he wrote Weyl on 19 April a detailed response (CPAE, Vol. 8,
Doc. 512; later published as Einstein (1918b), from which citations
are taken). Light rays, Einstein claimed, are not sufficient as space–
time measuring devices: ‘there would indeed be an indeterminate
factor left in the line-element ds (as well as in the gik)’ (Einstein,
1918b, 478). This indeterminacy can be removed by using rods and
clocks, which allow us to make a global choice of the measuring
units. In particular, ‘a time-like ds can be measured directly by a
standard clock whose world-line is contained in ds’ (Einstein,
1918b, 478), so that
R
ds would measure the elapsed time between
two arbitrary time-like separated events. This definition would
become physically empty, ‘if the length of a unit measuring-rod (or
the rate of ticking of a unit clock) depended on its history’
(Einstein, 1918b, 478), as Weyl's theory implies.
Fortunately, nature happens to behave differently. At this point,
Einstein presented a powerful argument that would become
famous. In particular, he added a fundamental detail that was
curiously not emphasized in any previous correspondence with
Weyl, explicitly identifying clocks with atomic clocks. From this
perspective, if Weyl's theory was true, ‘chemical elements with
spectral-lines of definite frequency could not exist’ (Einstein,
1918b, 478) and ‘the relative frequency of two neighboring atoms
of the same kind would be different in general’ (Einstein, 1918b,
478). In Weyl's theory the final radiuses of, say, two hydrogen
atoms separated and then reunited might differ, depending on the
different circumstances they might have encountered. As a con-
sequence the spectral lines would not be sharply defined, but
should show intermediate values. Experience, however, shows
that atoms of a particular element are all ‘identical’, and can emit
only radiation with definite energies, that is, each type of atom
gives off a unique set of colors. Frequencies and therefore lengths
can be transported in an integrable way. Consequently, ‘it seems to
me that one cannot accept the basic hypothesis of this theory
whose depth and boldness every reader must nevertheless
admire’ (Einstein, 1918b, 478).
Some days later, on 27 April 1918 (CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 525), Weyl
expressed his intention to write an Erwiderung, a reply, which he
sent on 28 April (CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc 526) and would be published
alongside Einstein's Nachtrag (Weyl, 1918c). Weyl defended his
13 It must be noted that in a paper finished in October 1917 and published in
March 1918 (just about the time the drafts of Weyl's book were finished), Erich
Kretschmann had already shown that one must also use free-falling particles to
force the factor λ to be an arbitrary constant, and not a function of position.
Appealing to the constant curvature of the spatial slices of the world in Einstein's
new ‘cylindrical’ cosmological model, one can eliminate this degree of freedom as
well, by normalizing the constant factor¼1 so that curvature of space is constant
(Kretschmann, 1918, sec. 23; cf. Giovanelli (2013a)). This solution of the problem, as
we shall see, would be brought to the most radical speculative implications by
Weyl himself (and Eddington).
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theory by again expressing the same concerns about the use of
rods and clocks as measuring instruments as those found in his
book (cf. above Section, 2.2). As he pointed out, even in special
relativity it is at all obvious that ‘a rigid rod always has the same
rest-length if it is at rest in an inertial frame’ (Weyl, 1918c, 478;
my emphasis; tr. s.m. O’Raifeartaigh, 1997, 35) (i.e., the ‘world sheet’,
limited by the world-lines of its end-points is of constant width). No
less problematic is the assumption ‘that under the same circum-
stances, a standard clock has the same period in standard unit’
(Weyl, 1918c, 478–479; my emphasis; tr. O’Raifeartaigh, 1997, 35)
(i.e., assuming that c¼1). For small accelerations, Weyl continues,
most real clocks will behave as an ideal clock, that is, they record
the passage of elapsed proper
R
ds time along their world-lines:
however, this ‘is certainly not the case when the clock (or atom)
experiences the effect of a strongly varying electromagnetic field’
(Weyl, 1918c, 479; tr. O’Raifeartaigh, 1997, 35). The frequency of an
‘electric’ clock would be modified by an electric field, displaying, for
instance, a ‘Stark effect’ (the electric analog of the ‘Zeeman effect’),
so that their spectral lines would be shifted.
This situation is of course no different in general relativity.
Precisely ‘[b]ecause of this problematic behavior of rods and
clocks’, Weyl points out, ‘I have relied in my book Raum, Zeit,
Materie only on the observation of light-signals for the measure-
ment of the gik’ (Weyl, 1918c, 479; tr. O’Raifeartaigh, 1997, 35).
Weyl erroneously refers the reader to Kretschmann's paper
(Kretschmann, 1918) to support his incorrect claim (cf. footnote
12).14 But this of course does not affect the epistemological
significance of his reservations against the use of entities that
are too structured as measuring instruments. In general relativity,
one can at most assume that a clock at rest in a static gravitational
field that measures ‘the integral
R
ds in the absence of an electro-
magnetic field’ (Weyl, 1918c, 479; tr. O’Raifeartaigh, 1997, 35).
But additional assumptions are needed to assure that non-
gravitational forces do not affect the internal dynamics of our
clocks. In principle, ‘[h]ow much a clock behaves in arbitrary
motion in the common presence of arbitrary gravitational and
electromagnetic fields can only be determined by the computation of
the dynamic based on physical laws’ (Weyl, 1918c, 479; my
emphasis; tr. O’Raifeartaigh, 1997, 35). Whether the relative
lengths and periods of physical rods and clocks depend on their
prehistories or not ‘has to be justified by an explicit dynamical
calculation in both Einstein's theory and mine’ (Weyl, 1918c, 479;
tr. O’Raifeartaigh, 1997, 36).
For the time being, Weyl could tentatively point out that it was
plausible that ‘an oscillating system of definite structure that
remains in a definite static field will behave in a definite way’,
because ‘the influence of a possibly turbulent history will quickly
dissipate’ (Weyl, 1918c, 479; tr. O’Raifeartaigh, 1997, 36), making
the effect of the electromagnetic field on the atomic clock behavior
practically unnoticeable. Thus his theory was probably not ‘in
contradiction with this experimental situation (which is confirmed
by the existence of chemical elements for the atoms)’ (Weyl, 1918c,
479; tr. O’Raifeartaigh, 1997, 36).
However, Weyl clearly manifested his conviction that it would
be preferable to determine the properties of physical systems that
can serve as rods or clocks from the field equations of the theory—
which he hoped would be able to account for the granular
structure of matter—instead of assuming them separately as
primitive entities. Without such a ‘dynamical’ explanation, ‘the
mathematical ideal of vector-transfer, on which the construction of
the geometry is based’ has no simple and obvious connection ‘with
the real situation regarding the movement of a clock’ (Weyl, 1918c,
479; tr. O’Raifeartaigh, 1997, 36). Weyl considered ‘his’ geometry to
hold in reality because of its conceptual superiority—it is the ‘truly
infinitesimal geometry’ (Weyl, 1918d)—and not because of its
correspondence with the behavior of quite complicated material
measuring devices (on this topic cf. also Weyl to Einstein, 19 May
18, CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc 544, 767; and Einstein's reply on 31 May 1918,
CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc 551, 777).
Again, for our purposes, it is important to emphasize that the
feature of rods and clocks that was thought to require a ‘dynami-
cal’ explanation, was, so to speak, their ‘memorylessness’, the fact
the they stay objectively the same no matter what influences they
have been subjected to (cf. Weyl (1918c, 479)). Writing to Einstein
on 15 June 1918, Dällenbach, who could not hide his fascination
with Weyl's theory, made this point particularly clear. Dällenbach
recognized that ‘there must be some principle’, which ‘connects
the different world-points of my experience along a world-line’,
something ‘which is presupposed as invariant, as stable’, that can
be considered ‘again and again as the same’ (Dällenbach to
Einstein, 15 June 1918, CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 564, 801; my emphasis),
allowing the comparison of the length of two tracts along a world-
line. However, Dällenbach goes on, ‘you chose for this purpose
such complicated things as ‘rigid bodies’ or ‘clocks’. It seems to me
to be arbitrary’ (Dällenbach to Einstein, 15 June 1918, CPAE, Vol. 8,
Doc. 564, 801).
At the time, Dällenbach was finishing his dissertation under
Weyl's supervision (which would be published in October;
Dällenbach, 1918). There he tried to develop an electromagnetic
model of the stability of matter. Within this framework, matter
would be nothing but ‘a bulk of very many positive or negative
electrons’ (Dällenbach, 1918, 524), kept together by Lorentz-
invariant forces. He believed that this model could be ‘easily’
generalized to a generally covariant theory. At the time there was
no reason to expect that rods and clocks should not be treated as
equilibrium solutions of such a theory, just as any other ‘bulk’ of
matter would.
Einstein's answer to Dällenbach (after 15 June 1918) is to my
knowledge the best summary of the Weyl–Einstein debate and is
worth citing at length:
Weyl's theory is wonderful as conception, a genial intellectual
achievement [geniale Gedankenleistung], but I’m convinced
that nature is different. If therefore two ds at points at a finite
distance from each other are equal when measured with one
measuring rod or in one particular way, they are also equal
when measured some other way. This is a deep property of our
world, which must find expression in the foundation of physics
[…] I know that Weyl does not admit it. He would say that
clocks and measuring-rods must appear as solutions; they do not
occur in the foundation of the theory. But I find: if the ds is
measured by a clock (or a measuring-rod), is something
independent of prehistory, construction and the material, then
this invariant as such must also play a fundamental role in the
theory. Yet, if the manner in which nature really behaves would
be otherwise, then spectral lines and well-defined chemical
elements would not exist (Einstein to Dällenbach, after 15 June
1918, CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 565, 803; second emphasis mine).
Thus Einstein admitted again to Dällenbach that in principle it
would be better to consider rods and clocks as ‘solutions’ of some
general-relativistic theory of matter, instead of assuming them as
unexplained postulates. However, in contrast to Weyl, Einstein
believed that for the time being it was sufficient to regard the
mathematical invariance of the ds as having a physical counterpart
in the surprising ‘identity’ of atoms that was clearly supported by
the spectroscopic data. As he wrote to Besso in August 1918,
‘otherwise, sodium atoms and electrons of all sizes would exist’14 In Weyl (1919b, 194), he specified that free-falling particles are also needed.
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(Einstein to Besso, 20 August 1918, CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 604, 859; my
emphasis).
At the end of November 1918, Weyl sent Einstein the draft of a
new paper on his unified field theory (the revised version was
finished in January, and was published as Weyl (1919a)), where he
announced the plan to write a revised edition of his book (finished
in August and published as Weyl (1919b)), since the first two
editions—not least because of Einstein's enthusiastic review
(Einstein, 1918a)—had quickly sold out (Einstein to Weyl, 16
November 1918, CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 657, 949). After reading the
paper, Einstein reiterated his main objection to Weyl's theory (and
raised many others). If Einstein could put a finger on the manifest
lack of empirical confirmation of the theory, he was, however, also
forced to admit that the existence of identical atoms was essential
to securing the physical significance of the ds. After all, they were
the only physical systems that presented the peculiar kind of
identity needed to assure a consistent normalization of the ds: ‘[t]
he existence of spectral lines (of electrons of certain size)’, and thus
‘of clocks independent of their prehistory’, ‘makes it seem natural
that from the beginning we can treat the ds as an invariant’
(Einstein to Weyl, 21 November 1918, CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 661, 954).
It is understandable that for Einstein the issue was of essential
importance for the very physical meaningfulness of his theory. As
we have seen, it is precisely because all atoms of the same type are
absolutely ‘identical’, on the earth or on the photosphere of the
sun, that we can consider redshift observations as an empirical
‘test’ of general relativity. This effect was, however, very hard to
detect (Hentschel, 1994), as the results of the ‘American measure-
ments’ (Einstein to Weyl, 27 September 1918, CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc.
626, 894), performed by Charles Edward St. John, confirmed (St.
John, 1917). It is not surprising that by the end of the year on 16
December 1918, scarcely a month after the end of World War I,
Arthur Stanley Eddington (who had just finished writing his
influential report on relativity; Eddington, 1918), could be tempted
to use Weyl's theory to save general relativity from possible
refutation. If the redshift measurements failed, Weyl's theory
might furnish an explanation, showing that atoms might not
consistently measure their proper time if under the influence of
an electromagnetic field (Eddington to Weyl, 16 December 1918,
Wissenschaftshistorische Sammlungen der ETH-Bibliothek, Weyl
Papers, folder 91, p. 522).
2.4. Einstein, Weyl and the Young Pauli's ‘observability’ criterion
Einstein and Weyl, despite their dispute concerning the exis-
tence of a ‘central office of standards’ (Weyl, 1919a, 103; my
emphasis) that would ensure the global availability of units of
measure, did agree on the relationship a physical theory should
have with the material devices needed for its verification, and
possibly about the very program of a field-theoretical approach to
the problem of matter. In April 1919, Einstein himself had come to
display a more concrete interest in ‘a theory that will account for
the equilibrium of the electricity constituting the electron’
(Einstein, 1919a, 349) (something along the lines of Mie's theory),
and more generally an interest in ‘the possibility of a theoretical
construction of matter out of gravitational field and electromag-
netic field alone’ (Einstein, 1919a, 356) (that is, by considering only
the quantities gμυ and φυ).
However, a very different attitude towards these issues was
emerging from the German physics scene at about the same time.
In April 1919, the 19-year-old student Wolfgang Pauli, who in
January had already published a paper on general relativity (Pauli,
1919b), wrote a letter to Weyl, asking him several questions about
his unified field theory. Weyl, full of admiration for Pauli's youth,
referred him to the forthcoming third edition of his book (Weyl,
1919b), of which he had just received the proofs, and to the second
draft of his paper (Weyl, 1919b), to be published in the Annalen der
Physik (cf. Weyl to Pauli, 10 May 1919, Pauli, 1979, Doc. 1, 3).
Despite Einstein's criticisms, Weyl's program had become even
more ambitious. In particular, as he wrote to Pauli, in the paper he
had provided a more suitable presentation of the ‘Electron-
problem’, even without being able to solve it (cf. Weyl to Pauli,
10 May 1919, Pauli, 1979, Doc. 1, 3).
On the one hand, he imagined that non-linear field equations—
satisfying adequate regularity conditions—should lead to a discrete
set of solutions depending on some arbitrary but constant field
quantity β. The problem of matter would then become an
‘eigenvalue’ problem, where particle-like solutions would be
comparable to a set of ‘discrete eigenvalues’ of a non-linear
operator (cf. Weyl, 1919a, 129; cf. Scholz, 2006). On the other
hand, he expected that Einstein's field equation with the cosmo-
logical constant (Einstein, 1917b) should be a consequence of his
theory, making it natural to identify this quantity with the radius
of curvature of every slice of Einstein's spatially-finite spherical
universe. The speculations about the relations between the size of
the electron (and thus of the atom) and the size of the universe
became Weyl's essential line of defense against Einstein's objec-
tion (cf. Weyl (1919b, 260); for more details see Ryckman (2005,
sec. 6.4.2)).
Aside from attempting to answer Pauli's main objection—the
fact that the theory was unable to account for the difference
between positive and negative charge (cf. Weyl to Pauli, 10 May
1919, Pauli, 1979, Doc. 1, 4)—Weyl encouraged the young student
to publish his result independently (cf. Weyl to Pauli, 10 May 1919,
Pauli, 1979, Doc. 1, 3). Pauli's paper was finished in July and
published in October in the Physikalische Zeitschrift. As it appears
from a second paper on Weyl's theory that Pauli submitted in
November, Pauli initially seems to have been attracted to Weyl's
theory precisely because it offered ‘the possibility to explain and to
understand the existence of the electron’ (Pauli, 1919c, 461; tr.
Mehra & Rechenberg, 1982, 382). As Weyl points out, the con-
servation laws for charge and mass in classical electrodynamics do
not explain why all electrons always have the same mass and
charge, including after having interacted with different environ-
ments for an arbitrary amount of time (cf. Weyl, 1919a, 128).
However, Pauli added a further epistemological reservation, to
which he would return on many occasions in the years that
followed (cf. Hendry (1984)):
There is a physical-conceptual objection which should not be
forgotten. In Weyl's theory we continuously operate with the
field strength in the interior of the electron. For a physicist this
[the field strength] is only defined as a force on a test-body, and
since there are no smaller test-bodies than the electron itself,
the concept of the electric field strength in a mathematical
space-point seems to be an empty, meaningless fiction. One
should stick to introducing only those quantities in physics
which are observable in principle. Can it be that we are
following a completely false track when using the continuum
theories for the field in the interior of the electron? (Pauli,
1919a, 750; tr. Mehra & Rechenberg, 1982, 382).
Pauli introduced here ‘observability’ as a criterion for the
meaningfulness of physical quantities—a criterion that would
enjoy great success in some circles (cf. below, Section 3.4)—
rejecting the continuum theories precisely because they do not
satisfy such a criterion.
The young Pauli—who after all was Ernst Mach's godchild—was
already displaying here the strong epistemological ‘feeling’ that
the same individual abstract element that occurs in the theory (e.g.
the notion of ‘field strength’) must be directly coordinated with
the behavior of physically-existent, even if idealized, objects used
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as probes (e.g., small bodies of a certain reproducible mass and
charge). Unless the quantities introduced into the foundations of
the theory can be directly identified with such real objects, the
theory is thought to be physically empty. In the Maxwell–Lorentz
theory, electrons are needed as the seat of charges, whereas
Maxwell's equations are valid only for the ‘free field’ outside of
them. So the notion of an electric field strength inside of the
electron is ‘an empty, meaningless fiction’. As we shall see, Pauli
would need only a few months to explicitly extend this epistemo-
logical consideration to general relativity and to any attempt to
construct a general-relativistic theory of matter (see below,
Section 3.2).
The epistemological attitude of the young Pauli elicited a reply
from Weyl. In a letter to Pauli, dated 9 December 1919, Weyl
defended his program of a unified field theory against Pauli's
criticisms, even if he conceded that the problem of matter could
probably not be completely solved in a field-theoretical framework
without resorting to statistical considerations. In particular, he
argued that in some sense it is possible ‘to measure the fields in
the interior of the electron’ (Weyl to Pauli, 9 December 1919, Pauli,
1979, Doc. 2, 6), provided that differences inside of the electron
‘grow to an immediately noticeable magnitude’ (Weyl to Pauli,
9 December 1919, Pauli, 1979, Doc. 2, 6), producing some change in
its external behavior. He speculated that some change inside of the
electron due to its acceleration would account for the fact that
electrons in Bohr's stationary orbit do not radiate.
A few days later, on 23 December 1919, Max Born wrote to Pauli
that he read ‘with great interest’ (Pauli, 1979, Doc. 4, 10) his paper
on Weyl's theory (Pauli, 1919a). Born confessed to his future
assistant that he had been ‘especially interested’ in Pauli's claim
that ‘the application of the continuum theory to the interior of the
electron’ would be ‘meaningless, because one is then dealing with
things that are unobservable in principle’ (Born to Pauli, 23
December 1919, Pauli, 1979, Doc. 4, 10). The way out of ‘quantum
difficulties’ (Born to Pauli, 23 December 1919, Pauli, 1979, Doc. 4,
6), Born went on, should be sought while keeping this problem in
mind, and without carrying over the macroscopic concepts of
space and time into the quantum domain, where length and
distance cannot in principle be measured.
It is interesting that Einstein also seems to have taken Pauli's
objection very seriously, confessing to Born himself some weeks
later: ‘Pauli's objection is directed not only against Weyl's, but also
against everyone else's continuum theory. Even against one which
treats the electron as a singularity’ (Einstein to Born, 27 January
1920, CPAE, Vol. 9, Doc. 284, 387). However, Einstein, in contrast to
Born, did ‘not believe that one must abandon the continuum in
order to solve the [problem of] quanta’ (Einstein to Born, 27
January 1920, CPAE, Vol. 9, Doc. 284, 386–387). Even if the
space–time continuum could in principle be abandoned, as sug-
gested by Born, Einstein was more inclined to search for ‘differ-
ential equations for which the solutions no longer have any
continuum properties’ (Einstein to Born, 27 January 1920, CPAE,
Vol. 9, Doc. 284, 387). Einstein may have already recognized that in
order to pursue a field-theoretical approach to the problem of the
atomicity of matter, one should drop the epistemological model
defended by Pauli and replace it with a more sophisticated one.15
To Einstein, the failure of Weyl's theory to provide solutions
that corresponded to electrons seemed to be a fundamental failure
(cf. Einstein to Ehrenfest, 4 December 1919, CPAE, Vol. 9, Doc. 189,
267-268; and Einstein to Besso, 12 December 1919, CPAE, Vol. 9,
Doc. 207, 293). Einstein seemed progressively more convinced that
material bodies should turn out to be a mere manifestation of the
unique physical reality represented by the field. It is not surprising
that Born, in his semi-popular Frankfurt lectures on relativity,
which later became a widely-read book (Born, 1920), would adopt
the exact opposite attitude: the field is a ‘mere mathematical
device for conveniently describing processes in matter’ (Born,
1920, 171; tr. Born, 1922, 190). Before a test body is brought up,
the field lines in vacuo have as little physical reality as the lines of
latitude and longitude on the sea before, say, someone decides to
determine the position of a ship by means of astronomical
observations (Born, 1920, 171; tr. Born, 1922, 190).
3. 1920–1923. Einstein on rods and clocks in the public debate
Even if Einstein thought that Weyl's theory was flawed, he clearly
realized that the independence of rods and clocks from their
prehistories was a fundamental presupposition of the empirical
meaningfulness of the relativity theories. Einstein was briefly forced
to address this issue in public at Bad Nauheim, and more extensively
in his famous lecture, ‘Geometrie und Erfahrung’.
3.1. Rods, clocks and Born's principle of the physical identity of the
units of measure
Even if Einstein was convinced that Weyl's attempt to build a
unified field theory was untenable, he had clearly gained an
appreciation for the fact that the independence of rods and clocks
from their prehistory—which he deemed as sufficiently natural in
correspondence with Besso (cf. above, Section 2.1)—was not self-
evident, yet at the same time was essential to warrant the
empirical content of both relativity theories. At the beginning of
1920, in a long, unpublished article intended for Nature on the
conceptual development of relativity, Einstein felt compelled to
explicitly state that special and general relativity have to assume
the ‘independence of measuring rods and clocks from the pre-
history of their motions’ (Einstein, 1920a, 280[p. 12]). When ‘unit
measuring rods—compared in relative rest—are found to be equal’
(Einstein, 1920a, 280[p. 12]), then they should always be equal
when they are compared again. In a note he appended to the
manuscript, Einstein insisted that ‘this sort of equality (also for
clocks), one that is enduring and independent of the pre-history of
the motion, is a central presupposition of the whole theory’ (CPAE,
Vol. 7, Doc. 31, note 19).
As we have seen (cf. Section 2.1), Einstein was aware of this
presupposition no later than the end of 1916 (thus before Weyl's
theory was formulated). Weyl's theory had the effect of forcing
Einstein to mention explicitly the prehistory condition among the
presuppositions of both of his theories. Only if physical systems
satisfying this condition really exist in nature can the line element
ds be considered a ‘phys[ically] significant invariant’ (CPAE, Vol. 7,
Doc. 19, 149[p. 3]).
As Einstein wrote to Ernst Cassirer in June 1920, ‘conceptual
systems appear empty to me, if the manner in which they are to be
referred to experience is not established’ (Einstein to Cassirer,
6 June 1920, CPAE, Vol. 10, Doc. 44, 293). In particular, ‘[w]ith the
15 One might speculate that, after all, Einstein had already answered Pauli's
epistemological challenge a decade earlier in a series of unpublished lectures on
electromagnetism, mentioned above (see Footnote 7). Einstein explicitly consid-
ered it legitimate to extend the definition of the field strength obtained in vacuo
inside ponderable bodies (where the electricity is assumed to be distributed
continuously), even if “the force thus defined is no longer immediately accessible
to exp[eriment]” (CPAE, Vol. 3, Doc. 11, 325[p. 13]). See also Abraham (1905, 22) for
a similar remark. In other words, “we extend the application of the concept to cases
in which the definition [of the field strength in terms of force extorted to small
charged bodies] finds no direct application” (CPAE, Vol. 3, Doc. 11, 325[p. 13]). It is in
(footnote continued)
this context that, as I have mentioned, Einstein claimed (just like Weyl, cf. Section
2.2), that the individual parts of the theory should not be confronted with
experience; only the theory as a whole should be (see above, Footnote 7).
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interpretation of the ds as a result of measurement, which is
obtainable by means of measuring rods and clocks the general
theory of relativity as a physical theory stands or falls’ (Einstein to
Cassirer, 6 June 1920, CPAE, Vol. 10, Doc. 44, 293). General
relativity is a physical theory because it is possible to determine
physically the absolute value of ds. For example, two time-like ds
would be defined as ‘equal’ if between the beginning and the end
of the interval the same number of vibrations emitted by identical
atoms occurs. As we have seen, the gravitational redshift, just
like the transverse Doppler effect in special relativity, can be
taken as an empirical confirmation of general relativity only
because different atoms of the same substance can be regarded
as identically constructed clocks reproducing the identical unit
of time.
Put in more general terms, the empirical verification of the
relativity theory presupposes what Max Born, in his Frankfurt
lectures on relativity mentioned above, labeled the ‘principle of
the physical identity of the units of measure’ (Born, 1920, 191; tr.
Born, 1922, 211). Even though Born mentioned the principle only
in passing (and only in reference to special relativity; cf. Pierseaux,
2003), it does not seem an exaggeration to claim that the validity
of the principle is the conditio sine qua non of the physical content
of both relativity theories: the quantities that special and general
relativity are dealing with posses a physical meaning only if they
are consistently measured with the same, reproducible, ‘identical’
units. Taking distance and duration as basic measurable quantities,
as we do in special and general relativity, presupposes the
existence of reproducible standards of length and time, of rods
and clocks, functioning independently of their prehistories.
Weyl's theory thus had the ‘epistemological’ merit to suggest
that Born's principle could be wrong, or at least that relativity
theory gave no reason to assume that it actually holds in nature.
This was Besso's point of view, for instance, as can be inferred from
Einstein's response to him in a letter dated 20 August 1920:
The remark about Weyl's book refers to his theory of electricity.
I understand your view. You think: The invariance [Unveränder-
lichkeit] of the relative extension of bodies does not need to be
put in the foundation of the theory; it would be more beautiful
if it comes out as a consequence or acceptable if it had a special
place in the theory hypothesis. But do not forget that the
[Weyl's] theory is based on a measuring rods geometry. Then it
must be assumed that the relative lengths of measuring rods is
a function of their prehistory, whereas the real measuring rods
and clocks are relatively invariant. Then the measuring rods
that one uses in the foundation of the theory are only thought
measuring rods [nur gedachte Massstäbe] that behave differ-
ently from the real ones. This is repugnant (Einstein to Besso,
before 26 August 1920, CPAE, Vol. 10, Doc. 85, 347; first
emphasis mine).
Einstein was ready to admit that in principle it would be better
if ‘the invariance of the relative extension of bodies’ would come
out as a ‘consequence’ of the theory, as Weyl had suggested.16
However, he also saw the possibly unpleasant implications of this
view. It would have allowed Weyl to claim that a non-Riemannian
geometrical law of vector-transfer—the behavior of the ‘thought’
rods—obtains at the basis of his own theory, even though the
physical behavior of the ‘real’ rods turns out to be Riemannian.
Einstein found this position repugnant precisely because it would
imply that the behavior of the ‘real’ rods contradicts that of the
‘ideal’ ones’.
3.2. The Bad Nauheim debate
A month later, at the 86th Assembly of the Association of
German Scientists and Physicians (Versammlung der Gesellschaft
Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte) in Bad Nauheim in September
1920 (famous mainly for Einstein's confrontation with his anti-
relativity critics), Weyl pursued for the first time precisely this
strategy, which he had anticipated in his 1919 writings (cf. above,
Section 2.4). He outlined a now well-known speculative explana-
tion for the discrepancy between the behavior of ‘ideal’ and ‘real’
rods. Roughly, Weyl suggested that the atoms we use as clocks
might not preserve their size if transported, but adjust it every time
to some constant field quantity, which he could identify with the
constant radius of the spherical curvature of every three-
dimensional slice of the world, furnishing a natural unit of length.
The geometry read off from the behavior of material bodies would
appear different from the actual geometry of space–time, because
of the ‘distortion’ due to the mechanism of the adjustment.
In the discussions at the Bad Nauheim meeting, Einstein
maintained his characteristically ambiguous attitude towards the
role of rods and clocks in relativity theory. After Weyl's talk, he
insisted once again that the ‘arrangement of [his] conceptual
system,’ ‘it has become decisive [massgebend] to bring elementary
experiences into the language of signs [Zeichensprache]’ (Einstein
in the discussion of Weyl (1920, 650)). For Einstein, ‘temporal–
spatial intervals are physically defined with the help of measuring
rods and clocks’, under the assumption that ‘their equality is
empirically independent of their prehistory’ (Einstein in the
discussion of Weyl (1920, 650)). Einstein insisted that precisely
upon this assumption rests ‘the possibility of coordinating
[zuzuordnen] a number ds to two neighboring world points’;
if this was impossible, general relativity would be robbed of ‘its
most solid empirical support and possibilities of confirmation’
(Einstein in the discussion of Weyl (1920, 650)).
During the discussion following Max von Laue's paper on the
redshift, however, Einstein showed a quite different attitude. Laue
showed that the coordinate interval dϑ measured by an atom on
the sun is transmitted unchanged by light signals (at least in a
static gravitational field17), so that the redshift emerges by con-
fronting the frequency of such signals with those of an atom of the
same type at rest measuring the proper time dτ.
Replying to some concerns expressed by the mathematician
Georg Hamel during the discussion (cf. also Hamel (1921)),
Einstein pointed out that ‘[s]ince the emitting atoms are to be
regarded as a clock in the sense of the theory’ (Einstein in the
discussion of Laue (1920)), that is, as identically constructed
clocks, ‘then the redshift is one of the safest results of the theory’.
One can ‘verify’ that the relation dτ2 ¼ g44dϑ2 established by
general relativity actually holds in reality. After all, during the
same session of the conference, a young Bonn spectroscopist
named Leonhard Grebe had communicated very favorable results
(obtained in collaboration with Albert Bachem), measuring the
shift of the cyanide band of the sun spectrum (Grebe, 1920; cf.
Hentschel, 1992b, for more details).
Einstein, however, in the very same sentence, did not hesitate
to admit that ‘[it] is a logical shortcoming of the theory of relativity
in its present form to be forced to introduce measuring rods and
clocks separately instead of being able to construct them as
16 It is worth noting that this concern was shared by other relativists at about
the same time. Eddington also insisted that “in a strict analytical development the
introduction of scales and clocks before the introduction of matter is—to say the least
of it—an inconvenient proceeding” (Eddington, 1920a, 152). It would be preferable
to “define matter in terms of the elementary concepts of the theory; then we can
introduce any kind of scientific apparatus, and finally determine what property of
the world that apparatus will measure” (Eddington, 1920b, 191).
17 In the general case, the number of vibrations of an atom transmitted by light
signals is coordinate-dependent.
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solutions to differential equations’ (Einstein's reply in Laue (1920,
662); my emphasis). Thus Einstein apparently believed that it
would be logically or epistemologically preferable if the field
equations of the theory had suitable solutions corresponding to
particles, from which in principle the stability of a more compli-
cated, bulky configuration of matter could be reconstructed,
including rod- and clock-like structures. In particular, only a few
months before, in his famous Leiden talk on aether and relativity
(Einstein, 1920b), Einstein had again expressed his preference for a
theory in which particle-like matter is nothing but particular
‘condensations [Verdichtungen] of the electromagnetic field’
(Einstein, 1920b, 14), possibly held together by gravitational forces.
Against this field-theoretical approach the young Pauli, in his
remarks at Bad Nauheim, reiterated his objection based on his
‘observability’ criterion. Just as the field strength in the interior of
the electron is meaningless because there is no smaller test
particle than the electron, ‘one could claim something similar
concerning spatial measurement, since there are no infinitely
small measuring-rods’ (Pauli in the discussion of Weyl (1920,
650)). The time or space intervals have a physical basis only if
there is some actual or possible physical process that has a length
or a duration shorter or equal to the space or time interval in
question. A distance smaller than the electron would be physically
meaningless since there is no physical process that could realize
such an interval. The attempt to define the electromagnetic field or
gravitational field in the interior of elementary particle to account
for their stability should be rejected on epistemological grounds.
Einstein's reaction was apparently evasive. On closer inspec-
tion, however, his answer shows that he had become aware of the
fact, that, in order to pursue a field-theoretical approach to the
problem of matter, the definition of the gravitational potentials in
terms of rods and clocks, which he had used against Weyl, was too
limited. Einstein pointed out to Pauli that ‘with the increasing
refinement of the system of scientific concepts, the manner and
procedure of associating the concepts with experiences become
increasingly more complicated’ (Einstein in the discussion of Weyl
(1920, 650)). In particular, he recognized that in cases such as that
of the continuum theories, ‘one finds that a definite experience
cannot be associated any longer with a concept’ (Einstein in the
discussion of Weyl (1920, 650)). According to Einstein, there is an
alternative: one can abandon ‘continuum theories’ for the sake of
Pauli's observability criterion, or replace such a ‘system of asso-
ciating concepts [with experiences] with a more complicated one’
(Einstein in the discussion of Weyl (1920, 650)). A decision as to
which alternative is more suitable, Einstein pointed out, can only
be given on the basis of pragmatic reasons (Einstein in the
discussion of Weyl (1920, 650)). However, it is clear that Einstein
would opt for the second choice. One should probably view the
epistemological considerations that he made in the following
years as an attempt to publicly justify this choice.
Pauli's test-particle-objection, together with many others,
appeared in a draft manuscript of his contribution on relativity
in the Enzyklopadie der Wissenschaften which must have already
circulated at Bad Nauheim. Perhaps it was after reading such a
draft (cf. Scholz (2006)) that Weyl decided to give up on a possible
field theory of matter in the form of Mie's theory (see Weyl's letter
to F. Klein on 28 December 1920), and started to conceive of
particles as singularities (cit. in Scholz (2006)). However, Weyl did
not agree with Pauli on the necessity of assuming rods and clocks
as empirical indicators external to general relativity. The 4th
edition of Raum, Zeit, Materie (Weyl, 1921a)—finished in November
1920—introduced the new strategy explained in Bad Nauheim.
The idea that real clocks behave according to the laws of Weyl's
world geometry is contradicted by the behavior of ‘atomic clocks’,
which emit spectral lines of a definite frequency. Weyl therefore
needed to explain ‘the discrepancy between the idea of congruent
transfer and the behavior of measuring-rods and clocks and atoms’
(Weyl, 1921a, 280; tr. Weyl, 1922a, 308).
The mechanism of adjustment is the only way to explain the
surprising fact that electrons and hydrogen nuclei always have the
same mass and charge, and thus the very existence of identical
atoms, along with the possibility that these atoms, under given
external conditions, settle into identical crystalline structures.
The fact that all electrons always have the same charge is
incomprehensible from the point of view of the Lorentz–Maxwell
theory, and had to be introduced as a separate hypothesis.
Classical mechanics and electrodynamics demand the overall
conservation of the mass m (dm=dt ¼ 0) and charge e (de=dt ¼ 0),
but the charge and mass of an individual macroscopic body will
not generally remain constant given the body's interaction with its
environment (cf. Weyl (1921a, 281)).
Weyl thus had good reasons to claim that the only explanation
for the fact that electrons always have the same mass and charge,
whatever their prehistory, might have been to assume that there is
some field quantity of the dimension of a length (i.e., it is simply a
number) to which the charge and mass of the electrons ‘adjusts’
itself in a certain proportion. This was, after all, the general
framework that, e.g., Mie (who also gave a talk at Bad Nauheim;
Mie, 1920) had tried to realize without any success (cf. also
Footnote 5). A certain state of equilibrium of the negative (or
positive) electricity would always be ‘reestablished’ whatever
disturbance it may have experienced in the past, just as the
magnetic needle always points north, despite what may have
happened to it previously.
Weyl's distinction between ‘adjusting’ and ‘persisting’ quanti-
ties more so expressed a problem than offered a solution. Thus,
Weyl never abandoned this distinction, even when he became
detached from the very idea of a unified field theory (see below,
Section 5.3; for a very effective presentation of this distinction see
Fogel, 2008, Sec. 3.2). The very existence of ‘identically con-
structed’ rods and clocks should be ‘decided on the basis of the
actually valid natural laws’ (Weyl, 1921a, 281), and not assumed
from the outset as a separate hypothesis. After all, Einstein's
assumption that physical clocks exist, that are fully ‘ahistorical’,
was anything but obvious. Two identical ‘classic’ atomic systems
with different prehistories would probably differ in some small
detail due to their interaction with the environment, and their
spectral lines would be slightly shifted, so that classically, a
spiraling charge should emit light of all colors. Emerging quantum
theory had already made clear that the spectral identity of atoms
revealed by experience cannot be explained in this framework. The
fact that all atoms of the same type are exactly identical clearly
cannot depend on an initial agreement established in the past,
which has been ‘preserved’ since then, even though the atoms had
encountered very different physical circumstances. It was more
plausible to argue that each time they ‘adjust’ anew to a certain
equilibrium value.
According to Weyl, without such a dynamical explanation of
their persistence, the use of rods and clocks as empirical indicators
should possibly be avoided. On 28 January 1921, he presented to
the Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen a paper in which
he proved rigorously—in terms of the relations between conformal
and projective structures of space–time—that the metric gik (and
thus the space–time geometry) can be determined (up to a choice
of a measuring unit) by the behavior of point particles and light
rays. ‘Measuring rods and clocks are not necessary for this’ (Weyl,
1921b, 101). However, two gik-systems agreeing on free-falling
particles and the trajectories of light rays might differ by a
constant factor (one might still be the scaled replica of the other).
Thus, a global definition of the measuring units, implied in the
fully Riemannian structure of space–time, was not possible with
this method (cf. Ehlers (1988)).
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3.3. Einstein's 1921 lecture on the foundation of geometry
On 27 January 1921, at the Berlin Academy's Leibniz Day public
celebration, Einstein gave an address entitled, ‘Geometrie und
Erfahrung,’ published in March as a paper and later as a booklet in
expanded form (Einstein, 1921a). I have emphasized elsewhere the
ambiguous influence that Einstein's talk exerted on the history of
philosophy of science (Giovanelli, 2013a, 2013b). It is not at all
surprising that Einstein used the lecture as an opportunity to place
himself along the epistemological spectrum—whose extreme posi-
tions may be best represented by Pauli and Weyl—by using a
language that was accessible to the non-specialist, though still
‘cultured’ public that attended the lecture.
Einstein famously attached ‘special importance to the view of
geometry’ (Einstein, 1921a, 126; tr., Einstein, 1954a, 235) as the
study of the laws of the possible disposition of practically-rigid
bodies, because ‘without it I should have been unable to formulate
the theory of relativity’ (Einstein, 1921a, 126; tr., Einstein, 1954a,
235). However, Einstein emphasizes that there are good reasons to
‘reject the relation between the body of axiomatic Euclidean
geometry and the practically-rigid body of reality’ (Einstein,
1921a, 126; tr., Einstein, 1954a, 235). The geometrical behavior of
physical bodies depends upon temperature, external forces, etc.
Thus, as Poincaré showed, if the behavior of bodies contradicts
Euclidean geometry, the latter can always be saved by blaming the
apparent non-Euclidean behavior of rods and clocks on some
distorting influences.
Of course, the supporter of practical geometry could claim that
it is always possible to isolate bodies from such distorting
influences, and thus ‘to determine the physical state of a
measuring-body so accurately that its behavior relative to other
measuring-bodies shall be sufficiently free from ambiguity, allow-
ing it to be substituted for the ‘rigid’ body’ (Einstein, 1921a, 127; tr.,
Einstein, 1954a, 237). This would imply, however, that one pos-
sesses a detailed knowledge of the dynamical laws that describe
the material constitution of the measuring bodies. In this sense,
Poincaré could rightly point out that ‘[g]eometry (G) predicates
nothing about the behavior of real things, but only geometry
together with the totality (P) of physical laws can do so’ (Einstein,
1921a, 126–127; tr., Einstein, 1954a, 236). Using symbols, Einstein
famously claimed that ‘only the sum of (G)þ(P) is subject to
experimental verification’ (Einstein, 1921a, 127; tr., Einstein,
1954a, 236).
This, of course, is the exact opposite of the strict opposition
between axiomatic and practical geometry from which the lecture
started. Einstein thus maintains a characteristically ambivalent
stance, which is well expressed by this passage:
Sub specie aeterni Poincaré, in my opinion, is right. It is also
clear that the solid body and the clock do not in the conceptual
edifice of physics play the part of irreducible elements, but that
of composite structures, which must not play any independent
part in theoretical physics. But it is my conviction that in the
present stage of development of theoretical physics these con-
cepts must still be employed as independent concepts; for we
are still far from possessing such certain knowledge of the
theoretical principles of atomic structure as to be able to
construct solid bodies and clocks theoretically from elementary
concepts (Einstein, 1921a, 127, my emphasis; tr., Einstein, 1954a,
236–237).
In spite of the reference to Poincaré, the alternatives that
Einstein describes in this passage strongly resemble those he
had addressed in the letter to Dällenbach some years before, and
later discussed in his correspondence with Weyl.
Sub specie temporis, in the present state of the development of
physics, Einstein had adopted the view that rods and clocks should
be used to give physical content to the physical quantities that
special and general relativity deal with, even though neither
theory has the conceptual means to explain the stability of such
material systems. Sub specie aeterni, however, rods and clocks
should emerge as solutions of a future theory of matter, possibly a
field theory encompassing gravitation and electromagnetism that
can account for the existence of rod- and clock-like configurations
of matter. E.g., a ‘rod’ is made up of a definite number of atoms
held together by electromagnetic forces governed by quite definite
physical laws. It could be said to be rigid, that is, to preserve the
‘same’ length, when, according to these laws, it is expected to
‘settle’ every time into the ‘same’ equilibrium configuration. Thus,
what is actually compared to reality is only geometry together
with these physical laws (cf. Cunningham, 1921, 131, finished in
1920, for a similar remark).
Again, Einstein was clearly pleading for a ‘dynamical explana-
tion’ of the behavior of rods and clocks; but it is important to
emphasize the kind of behavior initially assumed as obvious, and
that begged for a dynamical explanation. According to Einstein, ‘[a]
ll practical geometry is based upon a principle which is accessible
to experience’. Let us call two (irreversible) marks upon a
practically-rigid body a ‘tract’ (Einstein, 1921a, 127; tr., Einstein,
1954a, 237; cf. Hemmo and Agar (2013)). Then two tracts are said
to be ‘equal to one another’, that is, have the same length, if the
‘marks’ of one tract can be brought to coincide with those of the
other. An analogous process can be imagined for clocks leaving
(irreversible) marks on a dial, which can in some sense be brought
to coincidence with marks left by another clock. It must be
presupposed that this procedure leads to consistent results:
If two tracts are found to be equal once and anywhere, they are
equal always and everywhere […] The above assumption for
tracts must also hold good for intervals of clock-time in the
theory of relativity […]: if two ideal clocks are going at the same
rate at any time and at any place […], they will always go at the
same rate, no matter where and when they are again compared
with each other at one place. If this law were not valid for
natural clocks, the proper frequencies for the separate atoms of
the same chemical element would not be in such exact
agreement as experience demonstrates. The existence of sharp
spectral lines is a convincing experimental proof of the above-
mentioned principle of practical geometry. This, in the last
analysis, is the reason that enables us to speak meaningfully of a
Riemannian metric of the four-dimensional space–time conti-
nuum (Einstein, 1921a, 127–128, my emphasis; tr., Einstein,
1954a, 237).
There is little doubt that Einstein is reiterating here his
argument in favor of the fact that atoms are reliable clocks, the
same argument that he had used against Weyl's theory: the
existence of well-defined spectral lines for atoms of the same
time, independently of what might have happened to them in the
past, provides compelling ‘empirical evidence’ that the geometry
of space–time is Riemannian.18 Single atoms of the same element
18 Michael Friedman, in one of the most cited and influential papers on
“Geometrie und Erfahrung” claimed that Einstein's paper should be understood
“against the background of a preceding conception of geometry—one that was
dominant in the nineteenth century” (Friedman, 2002, 196; see also Friedman
(2010, 2014)). More recently Ryckman (2005) has insisted that Einstein's “Geome-
trie und Erfahrung” should be read in the context of the Einstein–Weyl debate.
I tend to agree with Ryckman, that Einstein's homage to the classical Helmholtz–
Poincaré debate should be considered more as an analogy (see also below, Section
4). Einstein seemed to be more concerned by the very assumption that the relative
lengths of rods is independent of prehistory, an assumption that characterized all
Riemannian geometries, than he was with the problem of making a choice between
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certainly have different histories, but their mass and proper
frequencies are always the same (cf. also Einstein (1921b, 262)
and Einstein (1922b, 41)).
If the choice of the units of measure is conventional (which
atom we chose do define the time unit is arbitrary), the ratio of
such units can be regarded as absolute dimensionless constants.
Under this presupposition we can normalize time and length
intervals once and for all, so that the length of the interval
between any pair of space–time points can be compared with
that of any other in terms of these units. After all, the entire
empirical content of relativity is that it makes predictions about
the value of length and time differences. For these predictions to
be testable empirically, it is essential that the units of measure
should be physically reproducible.
Once such an assumption has been granted, then the question
of whether the geometry of space is Euclidean or non-Euclidean
‘must be answered by experience, and [is] not a question of a
convention to be chosen on grounds of mere expediency’ (Einstein,
1921a, 127; tr., Einstein, 1954a, 238). Let's consider a small rigid
rod, which has the same length in every location and orientation.
If its length, over a finite region of space, is determined solely by
the coordinate differences of its end points, then the geometry is
Euclidean. If this turned out to be impossible, for any choice of
coordinates, then the geometry of space would be non-Euclidean,
and coordinate distances should be multiplied by the ‘conversion
factors’ gμυ to be translated into proper distances. In this sense,
practical geometry simply summarizes the laws of the disposition
of practically-rigid bodies, and can be empirically confirmed or
falsified.
In a remark that without doubt addresses the point that Pauli
made at Bad Nauheim, Einstein admits that such practical
approach to geometry would probably fail at the submolecular
level. The validity of the practical geometry ‘inside’ of elementary
particles would be based on extrapolation. For instance, we could
legitimately raise the question, whether ‘gravitational fields play a
part in the constitution of matter’, and thus whether the ‘con-
tinuum within the atomic nucleus [is] to be regarded as appreci-
ably non-Euclidean’ (Einstein, 1921c, 409; cf. also CPAE, Vol. 7, Doc.
50, 377), even if in principle there are no rods or clocks smaller
than the elementary particles:
It is true that this proposed physical interpretation of geometry
breaks down when applied immediately to spaces of submole-
cular order of magnitude. But nevertheless, even in questions
as to the constitution of elementary particles, it retains part of
its significance. For even when it is a question of describing the
electrical elementary particles constituting matter, the attempt
may still be made to ascribe physical meaning to those field
concepts which have been physically defined for the purpose of
describing the geometrical behavior of bodies which are large
as compared with the molecule. Success alone can decide as to
the justification of such an attempt (Einstein, 1921a, 127–128,
my emphasis; tr., Einstein, 1954a, 237).
Einstein recognizes that this extrapolation might fail, just like
the concept of temperature (defined as the average translational
kinetic energy of the molecules), cannot be attributed to the
molecules themselves. However, he seems to implicitly recognize
that in other cases it was possible to extend the use of a concept
beyond the domain in which it was initially defined. Clearly,
Einstein hoped that the field theory of matter unifying electro-
magnetism and gravitation might be such a case. For instance, the
geometry inside of elementary particles might be considered
legitimately as non-Euclidean—even if this claim cannot be ‘tested’
by using rods and clocks—if this assumption led to a theory that
has such particles as stable solutions.
There is, then, enough textual evidence to show that Einstein's
lecture can be properly understood only against a hidden dialogi-
cal background; the lecture was an attempt to offer an articulate
answer to the competing objections raised by Weyl and Pauli.
Against Weyl's theory Einstein pointed out that we have very
good reasons to regard atoms of the same substance as identically
constructed clocks. As Einstein put it in his Princeton lectures held
in May 1921, ‘this assumption is certainly warranted by experi-
ence’ (Einstein, 1922b, 41; my emphasis; tr., Einstein, 1923a, 67).
One can verify the predictions of general relativity, e.g., the value
of the ‘geometrical’ quantity g44 of the sun's gravitational field,
precisely because, if two identical clocks (on the sun and on the
earth) measure equal values of ds, the values of dx4 they measure
would differ by a factor
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
g44
p
(a difference that is responsible for
the gravitational redshift).
Against Pauli's observability requirement, Einstein was ready to
admit that stricto sensu such ‘definition’ of the g44 is not an
epistemological necessity, but only an initial compromise. In
principle, one can always account for the fact that the redshift is
not observed by assuming that the emitting atomic systems on the
sun are not ‘identical’ to the ones on earth, in order to compensate
for the appearance of the factor
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
g44
p
(cf. Silberstein, 1922, 105).
One has to keep in mind that what we actually compare to
experience is always geometry (the value of the g44) plus physics
(the theory of atomic spectra).
3.4. The consolidation of Pauli's observability criterion of meaning
It is precisely because of these epistemological conundrums
that Weyl believed he still had some cards to play. In 1921, the
‘pivotal year’ for unified field theories (Vizgin, 1994, ch. 4), Weyl
(followed to some extent by Eddington (1921a, b)) presented his
strategy of ‘doubling the geometry’ (the real ‘aether geometry’ and
the ‘body geometry’ distorted by the mechanism of adjustment),
in three papers intended for different audiences, finished in February
(Weyl, 1921b), May (Weyl, 1921c) and July (Weyl, 1921d). As he put it
in his account of the Bad Nauheim debate—which was finished in
August 1921 (but published the following year as Weyl (1922b))—the
problem of how ‘the comparison of the units of the ds in different world
locations is possible’ (Weyl, 1922b, 52; my emphasis) could not
simply be solved by returning to the happy coincidence that identical
atoms exist that consistently show the same spectral signature.
However, Weyl had to face a much fiercer opponent emerging
as the rising star of German physics. In September 1921, Pauli's
encyclopedia article on relativity theory (which was finished in
December, but underwent some improvements in April and May)
was finally published, as part of the fifth volume of the Enzyklo-
pädie der Mathematischen Wissenschaften, and later as a book with
an introduction by Pauli's mentor, Arnold Sommerfeld (Pauli,
1921). The article was unanimously considered a masterpiece, in
particular by Einstein himself (Einstein, 1922a). In chapter 5, Pauli
reiterated his technical and epistemological concerns about
attempts to derive the atomic nature of electricity from the
framework of the continuum theories.
Moreover, paragraph 65 amounts to a devastating epistemolo-
gical ‘deconstruction’ of Weyl's theory in particular, a critique that
was hard to dismiss. If Weyl's theory seeks to make predictions
(footnote continued)
Euclidean and non-Euclidean types of Riemannian geometries. However, I disagree
with Ryckman that the appearance of Weyl's theory was responsible for making
Einstein change his mind about the use of rods and clocks as unstructured entities.
As I have tried to show, the correspondence with Dällenbach indicates that
Einstein's position was fully defined before Weyl's theory was conceived (cf. above,
Section 2.1). Moreover, as Howard has shown, Einstein was committed to the ideal
that only the theory ‘as a whole’ can be compared with experience, at least in 1910–
1911 (cf. above, Footnotes 7 and 15).
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that are closely linked with the behavior of measuring rods and
clocks, just like Einstein's theory, then the theory is clearly wrong.
Not only should the effect of the electromagnetic field be notice-
able in the spectral lines of a given substance, but, as Pauli shows,
‘the differences would increase indefinitely in the course of time’
(Pauli, 1921, 763; tr., Pauli, 1958, 196). If one renounces this
interpretation, as Weyl later suggests (by blaming the Riemannian
behavior of clocks on the mechanism of adjustment), then the
theory loses its physical meaning, becoming just a mathematical
scheme that furnishes only ‘formal, and not physical, evidence for
a connection between [the] world metric and electricity’ (Pauli,
1921, 763; tr., Pauli, 1958, 196).
Thus, Pauli came to appreciate the definition of Weyl's ‘world
geometry’—as opposed to a ‘natural geometry’ by rods and clocks
—as a ‘graphical representation’ of reality, that Eddington had
suggested in his celebrated textbook on relativity, The Mathema-
tical Theory of Relativity (Eddington, 1923, dated August 1922), as
somehow illuminating (cf. also Eddington (1922)).19 As Pauli
confessed to Eddington in a letter from September 1923, he found
no logical contradiction in Weyl's (or Eddington's) approach, but
rather an epistemological shortcoming.
The letter to Eddington probably contains the most extensive
expression of Pauli's philosophical credo. In particular, he again
compared the definition of the electric field as force on electrically
charged test particles with that of the gravitational field in terms
of the behavior of rods and clocks:
The notion of field only makes sense if we are able to indicate a
reaction, which, in principle, would allow to measure the field
strengths at every space–time point, if we so desire. […] As
soon as the reaction ceases to be specifiable or in principle
executable, the respective field concept is no longer defined.
[…] I adhere to the (of course, unprovable) viewpoint that each
physical theory […] must start with a definition of the field
quantities used; the definition should state how these quan-
tities can be measured. […] (The most beautiful success of
relativity theory was indeed that it yielded a deep and tight
connection between the results of measurements of rods and
clocks, the orbits of freely-falling mass points and those of light
rays.) These postulates cannot be proved logically or by means
of the theory of cognition [erkenntnistheoretisch]. However,
I am convinced that they are correct (Pauli to Eddington, 23
September 1923, Pauli, 1979, Doc. 45, 117–118).
It must be emphasized that Pauli was not at all in a minority
position. Pauli's epistemological attitude turned out to be extre-
mely influential, especially among the Göttingen physicists who
started to develop quantum mechanics in the 10 years that
followed.
It is by appealing to this epistemology that Pauli confessed to
Bohr at the end of 1924 that one should consider ‘observable
properties of the stationary states’, such as the intensity of spectral
lines, as ‘something much more real than the ‘orbits’’ (Pauli to Bohr,
31 December 1924, in Pauli (1979), Doc. 79, 197) of electrons
around the nucleus in the Bohr–Sommerfeld atomic model. This
attitude clearly prevailed among the Göttingen community (cf.
e.g., Born (1925, 114), Born and Pascual (1925, 479fn). It is easy to
see the very same methodological stance reemerging in the
opening sentences of Werner Heisenberg's Umdeutung paper
(Heisenberg, 1925; cf. Camilleri, 2009, ch. 2).
4. 1923–1930s. The assessment of Einstein's two-stage strategy
Against the background of his first contributions to a unified field
theory, Einstein, in his semi-popular writings (in particular the
Nobel Prize lecture), once again tried to justify his provisional use
of rods and clocks to give the geometrical statements of the theory
empirical content, even though he agreed that they are compli-
cated physical systems described by rather complicated physical
laws.
In his letter, Pauli of course did not hide from Eddington that he
had similar concerns about ‘Einstein's work in the Berliner Bericht’’,
that he had just read (Pauli to Eddington, 23 September 1923,
Pauli, 1979, Doc. 45, 115), In early 1923 Einstein published in the
Proceedings of the Prussian Academy (Einstein, 1923b, 1923c), to
which he later added a paper in English in the September issue of
Nature (Einstein, 1923e). By January 1923, on his return trip from
Japan, Einstein's had by his own admission become infatuated
with Eddington's generalization of Weyl's theory. He wrote to Bohr
from the ship: ‘Eddington has come closer to the truth than Weyl’
(Einstein to Bohr, 10 January 1923, CPAE, Vol. 13, Doc. 421, 692).
Weyl wrote a letter to Einstein, criticizing Einstein's paper. How-
ever, he was pleased to meet Einstein ‘on the same purely
speculative paths’ against which he ‘always protested before’
(Weyl to Einstein, 18 May 1923, quot. and tr. in Stachel
(1986b, 240)).
In this context, Einstein probably found it even more pressing
to give a justification of his attitude toward the relationship
between theory and experience. After all, Einstein had on many
occasions defended a view à la Pauli, according to which relativity
theory has empirical content because its predictions may or may
not correspond to the behavior of rods and clocks that actually
exist. However, he often pointed out that it was actually ‘a logical
tension [Inkonsequenz]’, because one presupposes for the measure-
ments ‘such complicated structures [Gebilde] as measuring rods
and clocks as given, instead of constructing them from theoretical
concepts’ (Winternitz, 1923, 224).20
During the twenties, Einstein found several occasions to pub-
licly address the role of rods and clocks in relativity theory. One of
the more famous passages can be found in his delayed lecture for
his 1921–1922 Nobel Prize, delivered to the Nordic Assembly of
Naturalists at Gothenburg in July 1923:
The concept of the rigid body (and that of the clock) has a key
bearing on the foregoing consideration of the fundamentals of
mechanics, a bearing which there is some justification for
challenging. The rigid body is only approximately achieved in
Nature, not evenwith desired approximation; this concept does
not therefore strictly satisfy the content requirement [Inhalts-
forderung].21 It is also logically unjustifiable to base all physical
consideration on the rigid or solid body and then finally
reconstruct that body atomically by means of elementary
physical laws which in turn have been determined by means
of the rigid measuring body […] It would be logically more
correct to begin with the whole of the laws and to apply the
‘content-requirement’ to this whole first, i.e. to put the unam-
biguous relation to the world of experience last instead of
already fulfilling it in an imperfect form for an artificially
19 For a reconstruction of Eddington's position on this issue and how it differs
subtly from Weyl's, see Ryckman (2005, sec. 8.2).
20 The philosopher Joseph Winternitz—son of a colleague of Einstein's in
Prague and a friend of Leopold Infeld (who mentioned him simply as ‘Joseph’ in
his Infeld, 1942, cf. Ryckman, 2014, 397, n. 21)—rightly attributes this position to
Eddington (cf. Eddington (1923, 146)). Einstein wrote a positive review of
Winternitz's book (Einstein, 1924a), which is also a good documentation of his
stance toward Kant's philosophy (cf. Hentschel (1987)).
21 Inhaltsforderung is usually translated as ‘stipulation of meaning’. However,
the translation obscures the fact that the German expression seems to refer to the
conditions that a theory has to satisfy in order to have physical content.
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isolated part, namely the space–time metric. We are not,
however, sufficiently advanced in our knowledge of Nature's
elementary laws to adopt this more perfect method without
going out of our depth. At the close of our considerations we
shall see that in the most recent studies there is an attempt,
based on ideas by Levi-Civita, Weyl, and Eddington, to imple-
ment that logically purer method (Einstein, 1923d, 2–3; my
emphasis).
This well-known passage is consistent with Einstein's stance on
this matter in previous years, even though he nowmakes the point
in reference to special relativity. The problem is again establishing
under which conditions the abstract concept of a physical theory,
e.g. coordinate differences in the special theory, can satisfy the
Inhaltsforderung, that is, acquire physical meaningfulness (cf.
Miller (1981, 193). Initially coordinate differences were taken to
correspond to measurements carried out with the help of measur-
ing rods and clocks. Einstein now recognized that would have
been logically more correct to start with the laws governing the
constitution of matter and then to have deduced the properties of
measuring rods and clocks. Again, Einstein was concerned with an
epistemological issue: whether there are isolated parts of a theory
that are directly connected to experience, or whether it is only the
entire system of physical laws that is physically meaningful.
The same is of course true for general relativity. Here, in the
general case, it turns out to be impossible to recover distances
measured by rods and clocks from coordinate distances without
knowing the quantities gμν, which also play the role of the
gravitational field. The reference to the ‘logically purer method’
of Weyl and Eddington at the end of passage just cited shows in
which the context Einstein had become aware of the limits of such
epistemological attitude. Einstein hoped that a theory able ‘to
complete the basis of the general theory of relativity’ (Einstein,
1923d, 2)—by unifying the gravitational field (gμν) and the other
known ‘physical’ field, the electromagnetic field (φυ)—would
account for the existence of the electrically charged constituents
of matter (Einstein & Grommer, 1923, 2), which ultimately enter
into the very constitution of rods and clocks, which in turn serve to
define the gravitational field.
It is thus clear that if one wants to pursue such a program,
a very different conception of the relationship between theory and
experience should be used. In his more popular writings from this
period, Einstein had an opportunity to address this issue in
simpler terms. Some of these passages have already attracted the
attention of some interpreters (cf. in particular Howard (2014)),
but I will present them as further testimony to Einstein's stance on
the relationship between theory and measuring devices.
In a 1924 review of a book by Aldolf Elsbach, a minor Neo-
Kantian philosopher (Elsbach, 1924), Einstein distinguishes two
different ‘standpoints’ on the question of the relation between
geometry and experience:
The position that one takes on these claims depends on
whether one grants reality to the practically-rigid body. If yes,
then the concept of the interval corresponds to something
experiential. Geometry then contains assertions about possible
experiments; it is a physical science that is directly under-
pinned by experimental testing (standpoint A). If the
practically-rigid measuring body is accorded no reality, then
geometry alone contains no assertions about experiences
(experiments), but instead only geometry with physical
sciences taken together (standpoint B). Until now physics has
always availed itself of the simpler standpoint A and, for the
most part, is indebted to it for its fruitfulness; physics employs
it in all of its measurements. […] But if one adopts standpoint B,
which seems overly cautious at the present stage of the
development of physics, then geometry alone is not experi-
mentally testable. There are then no geometrical measure-
ments whatsoever […] Viewed from standpoint B, the choice
of geometrical concepts and relations is, indeed, determined
only on the grounds of simplicity and instrumental utility.
Concerning the metrical determination of space, nothing can
then be made out empirically […] because, on this choice of a
standpoint, geometry is not a complete physical conceptual
system, but only a part of one such (Einstein, 1924b, 1690–
1691; tr. Howard, 2014, 367).
The conflict of these two points of view clearly corresponds to
the opposition between the unnamed ‘defender of practical
geometry’ (standpoint A), and that of ‘Poincaré’ (standpoint B),
the same opposition that Einstein had introduced in the 1921
lecture. In a brief paper published a year later, ‘Nichteuklidische
Geometrie und Physik’ (Einstein, 1925), Einstein added another
detail, explicitly attributing ‘standpoint B’ to Hermann von
Helmholtz:
In order to see the matter clearly, one must consistently adopt
one of two points of view. In the first, one holds that the ‘body’
of geometry is realized in principle by rigid bodies in nature,
provided that certain conditions are met regarding tempera-
ture, mechanical strain, etc.; this is the point of view of the
practical physicist. In this case, the ‘distance’ of geometry
agrees with a natural object and thereby all propositions of
geometry gain the character of assertions about real bodies.
This point of view was especially clearly advocated by Helm-
holtz, and we can add that without him the formulation of
relativity theory would have been practically impossible. In the
other point of view, one denies in principle the existence of
objects that agree with the fundamental concepts of geometry.
Then geometry by itself would include no assertions about
objects of reality, only geometry taken together with physics.
This point of view, which may be more complete for the
systematic representation of a finished physics, was expounded
particularly clearly by Poincaré. From this standpoint, the entire
content of geometry is conventional; which geometry is pre-
ferable depends on how ‘simple’ physics can be made by using
geometry to agree with experience (Einstein, 1925, 253; my
emphasis; tr. Pesic, 2007, 161).
As in the 1921 lecture on geometry and experience (using
nearly the very same words) Einstein insists that the ‘Helmholt-
zian’ approach, in which the interval is regarded as measured by
rods and clocks, made relativity theory physically possible. Rela-
tivity theory is nothing but a theory concerning the ‘Lagerungs-
Gesetze’, the possible displacements of many infinitesimal rigid
rods (isolated from relative motions, temperature differences or
other influences). However, the fiction of the existence of perfect
rigid bodies that we had initially assumed as at least in principle
possible might turn out to be untenable: special relativity has
already put restrictions on the use of rigid bodies of finite
dimensions (see also Einstein (1924c, 86)) and the theory of
elementary quanta might force us to abandon the notion of rigid
bodies in the atomic domain (Einstein, 1925, 253) (if, for instance,
rigidity depends on the crystalline structure of the rod, we cannot
proceed to indefinitely small rods without losing this structure).
We could then refuse to extend the use of the concept of ‘interval’
when the initial definition in terms of observable entities fails, e.g.,
inside of elementary particles. Or, as Einstein was inclined to do, we
could try to extend its use to a wider domain by integrating it into a
more comprehensive theoretical structure, which could then be
compared with experience as a self-supporting totality; e.g., we
could claim that non-Euclidean geometry is valid inside of elemen-
tary particles, if this claim is part of a consistent unified field theory
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that correctly reproduces such elementary particles as solutions.
Einstein is envisaging here a sort of ‘Poincaréan’ attitude towards the
relationship between geometry and experience. After all, the initial
definition of the interval that used rigid bodies (and clocks) was
obtained by resorting to certain physical processes described by
certain physical laws; strictly speaking, ‘geometrical’ concepts can
only be confronted with reality along with such laws.
Leaving aside Einstein's historical references, it is clear that the
commitment to this double standard was one of the peculiar
features of Einstein's epistemology. It appears again in the entry
for ‘space–time’ in the 13th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica
form 1926. Here, Einstein introduces a similar opposition between
the ‘defender of practical geometry’ and the more sophisticated
position defended by unnamed ‘consistent thinkers’:
A serious difficulty is encountered in the above represented
interpretation of geometry in that the rigid body of experience
does not correspond exactly with the geometrical body. In stating
this I am thinking less of the fact that there are no absolutely
definite marks than that temperature, pressure and other
circumstances modify the laws relating to position. It is also
to be recollected that the structural constituents of matter
(such as atom and electron […]) assumed by physics are not in
principle commensurate with rigid bodies, but that neverthe-
less the concepts of geometry are applied to them and to their
parts. For this reason consistent thinkers have been disinclined to
allow real contents of facts [reale Tatsachenbestände] to corre-
spond to geometry alone. They considered it preferable to allow
the content of experience [Erfahrungsbestände] to correspond to
geometry and physics conjointly. […] Nevertheless, in the
opinion of the author it would not be advisable to give up
the first view, from which geometry derives its origin. This
connection is essentially founded on the belief that the ideal
rigid body is an abstraction that is well rooted in the laws of
nature (Einstein, 1926, 609; my emphasis; German in the
original).
This passage repeats Einstein's characteristic position between
the two extremes of the epistemological spectrum. It was legit-
imate to provisionally adopt the point of view according to which
‘natural geometry refers to the directly observable specification
[Angaben] of rods and clocks’ (Pauli, 1926, 273). At the same time it
was legitimate to try to apply geometrical concepts thus defined to
domains where their initial definition is no longer available.
As more consistent thinkers have pointed out, an ‘experimental
test of geometry’ (Weyl, 1927, 96) is actually impossible; the
individual laws of physics and those of geometry ‘can only be
put to the test as a whole’ (Weyl, 1927, 96).
5. 1930s–1950s. Einstein's last reflections on rods and clocks
In the last twenty years of his life, Einstein showed growing trust
in the power of mathematical speculation. However, he did not
substantially change his opinion about the role of rods and clocks
in relativity theory. In particular, in an often-quoted passage from
his ‘Autobiographical Notes’, where he confesses his ‘sin’ towards
his initial treatment of rods and clocks as unstructured entities,
Einstein seems to address the very same epistemological concerns
that occupied him in the early days of general relativity.
Cornelius Lanczos (who was Einstein's assistant during the
period of 1928–1929), in popular writings (Lanczos, 1931, 1932) on
Einstein's new theory based on distant-parallelism (Einstein,
1928a, b, 1930d; cf. Sauer, 2006), described the physics community
after the triumph of quantum mechanics, as divided into two
epistemological fronts: (1) the ‘positivists’, who rejected the very
use of differential-geometrical methods in physics, since they
violate the observability criterion (even the ds2 is strictly speaking
unobservable since there are no infinitesimally small rods); and
(2) the ‘metaphysicians’, who were convinced that the deep
structure of nature could be grasped only by means of speculative
mathematical constructions (Lanczos, 1931, 104–105; cf. also
Lanczos, 1932, 116).22
Several passages from different, mostly popular writings from
the turn of the thirties show traces of Einstein once again trying to
find a precarious equilibrium between the ‘positivistic’ justifica-
tion of relativity theory and the ‘metaphysical’ one, more in
consonance with his works on unified field theory (Lanczos,
1931, 99).23 On the one hand, Einstein continued to warn his
readers that one should not forget that the general-relativistic field
equations can be said to ‘hold’ in reality since they correctly
predict the values of the gμυ, that in turn determine the observed
behavior of rods and clocks (Einstein, 1928c, 164–165; Einstein,
1929b, 1930a, 1930b, 1930c, 1936, 356–357). On the other hand,
simultaneously to his work on the unified field theory, he showed
increasing confidence in the power of pure mathematical spec-
ulation, so that ‘internal’ criteria (such as simplicity) seem to
furnish the only assurance of the correspondence between
abstract theory and reality: the field equations are ‘correct’
because they are the simplest generally-covariant differential
equations which the gμυ can satisfy (Einstein, 1929a, 1933, 15;
Einstein, 1936, 369).
5.1. The Einstein–Swann correspondence
Despite Einstein's progressively stronger tendency to consider
nature the ‘realization of the simplest conceivable mathematical
ideas’ (Einstein, 1933, 15; cf. Dongen, 2010; Norton, 2000), he
seems to have maintained his characteristic double-truth doctrine
concerning the role of rods and clocks in his theory. A particularly
clear articulation of this stance is revealed by Einstein's corre-
spondence with the Anglo-American physicist William Francis
Gray Swann, which has recently drawn some attention (cf.
Brown, 2005, 120, fn. 19; and in particular Hagar, 2008; cf. also
Stachel, 1993). In a letter to Nature, written in September 1941 (but
published in December)—referring to the ‘recent discussion
between Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington’ (Swann, 1941,
692)—Swann explained his non-standard view on length contrac-
tion as a quantum-mechanical phenomenon that should be
explained dynamically by a Lorentz-invariant theory of matter
(Brown, 2005, 119–121).
In his reply, Eddington repeated what he had already explained
at length in his Tarner lectures in 1938 (Eddington, 1939), and
what I have tried to show in the preceding sections. Relativity
theory must refer to quantum mechanics but for a very different
reason: ‘relativity theory has to go outside its own borders to
obtain the definition of length, without which it cannot begin’
(Eddington, 1939, 76; my emphasis). In order to make the theory
empirically meaningful we need to make statements about lengths
in a remote star or at a remote epoch, implying that there are
physical standards that can be constructed there ‘identically’ to a
22 The opposition is, of course, rough. Weyl, after the discovery of the ‘matter
fields’ and the possibility of deducing the existence of identical particles from their
quantization (Darrigol, 1986, cf. Schweber, 1994, ch. 1), had become very critical of
Einstein's “geometrical capers [Luftsprünge]” (Weyl, 1931, 56, cf. Scholz, 2006).
He even conquered Pauli's hard-to-win admiration (Pauli to Weyl, 26 August 1929,
Pauli, 1979, 518–519) for applying his gauge invariance principle to the Pauli-Dirac
theory of the spinning electron (Weyl, 1929a, 1929b). However, Weyl did not
embrace a positivistic epistemology (Weyl, 1932, 1934a, 2009).
23 In a letter to Moritz Schlick on 28 November 1930 Einstein explicitly used
the expression: “you will be surprised by Einstein the ‘metaphysician’. But in this
sense every four- and two-legged animal is, de facto, a metaphysician” (AEA, 21–
603).
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corresponding terrestrial standard. This is possible only if the two
standards can be constructed from a common specification; for
instance, because they stay in definite numerical ratio with some
dimensionless pure number, such as h/mc, the ‘wave-length’ of the
electron, which appears in the fundamental equations of Dirac's
electron theory (cf. Eddington, 1941, 692–693), a constant which
Eddington (cf. Eddington (1933)), in contrast to Weyl (cf. Weyl
(1934b)), still hoped might be connected with the radius of
curvature of the universe.
Swann remained unsatisfied with Eddington's reply and
decided to write to Einstein himself in January 1942 (the episode
is recounted in detail in Hagar (2008)). Einstein's response,
however, seems to confirm Eddington's view. The original German
and a translation of the letter can be found in Hagar (2008, 2014,
153–154), but I will provide a relevant excerpt:
In the special theory of relativity measuring rods and clocks
(idealized, but in principle conceived as realizable) are treated
as independent physical objects, which, linked as they are to the
coordinates of the theory […] [,] are consciously not treated as
solutions under the basis of structure laws [Struktur-Gesetzen].24
This is well justified because from the point of view of our
experiences, the (in principle) existence of those objects that
can serve as measures for coordinates appears better justified
than any particular structure laws, e.g. Maxwell's equations.
But if one does not [sic] introduce rods and clocks as independent
objects into the theory, one has to have a structural theory in
which a length is fundamental [eine Länge fundamental ein-
geht], which then leads to the existence of solutions in which
that length plays a determinant role, so that a continuous
sequence of similar solutions no longer exists […]. Any theory
that has a universal length in its foundation, and because of this
produces qualitatively distinct solutions of a certain extension,
would do the same with regard to the question under exam-
ination here (Einstein to Swann, 24 January 1942, AEA, 20–624;
my emphasis; tr. s.m.).
Einstein again insists that, even if initially special relativity
relied on the experiential fact that rod- and clock-like localized
and stable structures exist in nature, in principle one should
search for a relativistic field theory of matter that would allow
for only a discrete number of solutions, fromwhich rod- and clock-
like structure could be constructed. This passage however adds a
detail that was not explicit in the other similar passages I have
quoted, which, as far I can see, confirms the reading of Einstein's
attitude towards rods and clocks that I have suggested. According
to Einstein, whatever theory one might use—possibly, but not
necessarily a field theory (Stachel, 1986a, 2002)—the theory should
have a fundamental length scale in its foundation. The existence of
particles of constant size and charge (and of more complicated
structures such as atoms or crystals) would then be explained by
the fact that they stay in the same proportion with such a
fundamental length, rather than being postulated from the outset
as an unexplained fact. This confirms that the issue at stake was to
account for the existence of rods and clocks of the same size in
order to assure the reproducibility of the measuring units.
Of course, this was only a program and not a theory. The
difficulty of accounting for the existence of matter in a field-
theoretical framework had been addressed by Einstein in a brief
note published in a rather obscure Argentinian journal a year
earlier (Einstein, 1941), and later in a paper written with Pauli
(Einstein & Pauli, 1943). Under very general conditions, any
attempt to base a unified theory on the Riemann tensor would
necessarily involve singularities in particle-like solutions (Einstein,
1944; Einstein & Bargmann, 1944). This result represented, of
course, a serious threat to Einstein's ambitions, given his deep
conviction that a field theory ‘which claims to be complete (in
contrast e.g. to the pure theory of gravitation)’ (Einstein & Straus,
1946), should have rigorous solutions ‘which are regular in the
entire space’ (Einstein & Straus, 1946, 737).
5.2. Einstein's epistemology in the Schilpp volume
The letter to Swann provides further evidence that Einstein's
epistemological attitude does not seem to have changed at all from
the letter to Dällenbach where we started. The opposition between
what can be accepted sub specie temporis, as provisional compro-
mise, and what should be maintained sub specie aeterni, in
principle, returned again in an often-quoted passage from Ein-
stein's autobiographic notes written for the Schilpp volume:
One is struck [by the fact] that the theory [of special relativity]
[…] introduces two kinds of physical things, i.e., (1) measuring
rods and clocks, (2) all other things, e.g., the electromagnetic
field, the material point, etc. This, in a certain sense, is
inconsistent; strictly speaking measuring rods and clocks
would have to be represented as solutions of the basic equa-
tions (objects consisting of moving atomic configurations), not,
as it were, as theoretically self-sufficient entities. However, the
procedure justifies itself because it was clear from the very
beginning that the postulates of the theory are not strong
enough to deduce from them sufficiently complete equations.
If one did not wish to forego a physical interpretation of the co-
ordinates in general (something which, in itself would be
possible), it was better to permit such inconsistency, with the
obligation, however, of eliminating it at a later stage of the
theory. But one must not legalize the mentioned sin so far as to
imagine that intervals are physical entities of a special type,
intrinsically different from other physical variables (‘reducing
physics to geometry’, etc.) (Einstein, 1949a, 59, my emphasis).
This is the passage that is most often taken as evidence that
Einstein himself wanted to explain rod contraction and clock
dilation in a ‘constructive’ way. However, in my opinion, the
opposition between constructive and principle theories is not
the right framework for understanding the passage, which actually
does not differ significantly from the many others that I have
quoted so far. The ‘mentioned sin’ that should not be ‘legalized’ is
of purely epistemological nature. It concerns the relationship
between theory and experience.
Einstein assumed provisionally ‘[t]he existence (in principle) of
(ideal, viz., perfect) measuring rods and clocks’ (Einstein, 1949a,
59), which, if at rest in an inertial system, always measure the true
proper time and proper distance, and thus furnish physical
interpretation of the coordinates. This is the condition under
which special relativity can acquire the status of a physical theory,
‘which can be experimentally validated or disproved’ (Einstein,
1949a, 57). However, relativity theory cannot account for the
fortunate circumstance that we happen to live in a world in which
such physical systems exist. It would be better if we possessed
some special-relativistic theory of matter powerful enough to
account for the very existence of ‘geometrical’ objects (rods and
clocks) just like any other ‘physical’ object. Note that Einstein
explicitly claims that this would not mean to ‘geometrize’ physics,
but on the contrary would eliminate the arbitrary difference
between ‘two types of physical things’ the geometrical and non-
geometrical ones (cf. Lehmkuhl, 2014).
24 With the expression ‘structure laws’, Einstein understands those laws “that
lay claim to a general and strict validity, that is fundamental laws of nature”
(Einstein to Bohm, 28 October 1954, AEA 08-050, quot. and tr. in Dongen (2010,
181)).
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Another beautiful passage referring to general relativity from
Einstein's ‘Reply to Criticisms’ in the Schilpp volume (Einstein,
1949b, 685) seems to confirm this reading:
Everything finally depends upon the question: Can a spectral
line be considered as a measure of a ‘proper time’ ds
(ds2 ¼ gikdxidxk) (if one takes into consideration regions of
cosmic dimensions)? Is there such a thing as a natural object
which incorporates the ‘natural-measuring-stick’ independently
of its position in four-dimensional space? The affirmation of this
question made the invention of the general theory of relativity
psychologically possible; however this supposition is logically
not necessary. For the construction of the present theory of
relativity the following is essential:
(1) Physical things are described by continuous functions,
field-variables of four co-ordinates. As long as the topolo-
gical connection is preserved, these latter can be freely
chosen.
(2) The field-variables are tensor-components; among the
tensors is a symmetrical tensor gik for the description of
the gravitational field.
(3) There are physical objects, which (in the macroscopic
field) measure the invariant ds.
If (1) and (2) are accepted, (3) is plausible, but not necessary.
The construction of mathematical theory rests exclusively upon
(1) and (2). For the objects used as tools for measurement do
not lead an independent existence alongside of the objects
implicated by the field-equations (Einstein, 1949b, 685; my
emphasis).
Einstein suggested again (as in 1917) that he started out with
the provisional, but plausible assumption that in nature there are
physical processes that can be used to measure the invariant ds,
that will ‘normalize’ it as the unit interval, that is, that rods and
clocks that are not influenced by any gravitational field and
always have the same relative length and period exist. However,
as Einstein pointed out in a letter to an Australian medicine
student, this assumption ‘could be wrong even though the
gravitational field equations need not to be’ (Einstein to Leonard
Champion, 7 March 1951, AEA, 25–481).25 In what Einstein called
a ‘complete theory of physics as a totality’, which of course does
not yet exist, the field equations themselves would account for
the existence and behavior of those physical systems that we use
as tools of measurement. The distinction between geometrical
and non-geometrical objects would disappear, together with the
distinction between geometrical and non-geometrical fields,
which would be unified into one field (cf. Einstein to Lincoln
Barnett, 19 June 1948, AEA, 6–58; cit. and tr. in Lehmkuhl
(2014, 10)).
It is precisely the latter scenario that would have important
epistemological implications. Einstein insists again that one can-
not resort to the ‘operational’ definition of the gik outside the
‘macroscopic’, for instance, inside of elementary particles. The
application of this concept to the ‘microscopic’ should be based on
different considerations (Einstein, 1949b, 676), e.g., on the fact that
the gik become part of a more encompassing field theory in which
such particles appear as solutions: ‘In a consistent field theory
there is no real definition of the field’, Einstein wrote to Besso in
1950: ‘A priori no bridge to the empirical is given’, and ‘a
comparison with the empirically known can only be expected to
come from finding exact solutions of the system in which
empirically ‘known’ structures and their interactions are
‘reflected’’ (Einstein to Besso, 15 April 1950, in Speziali (1972,
438–439), tr. Stachel, 1986a, 2002, 376).
Thus, if one does not want to abandon the ‘continuum’, the
very project of a field-theoretical answer to the problem of matter,
one has to face its epistemological implications. Thus, Einstein's
plea for a dynamical explanation of rods and clocks should be
understood against the background of a general philosophical
question of how a theory is related to experimental devices, or
by keeping in mind—as he put it more emphatically—‘Pilate's
famous question: ‘What is truth?’’ (Einstein, 1949b, 676). It is not
a coincidence that Einstein, in discussing Hans Reichenbach's
‘meaning¼verifiability’ criterion, found it helpful to summarize
the different stances toward the relation between theory and
experience by resorting to an imaginary dialog between ‘Helm-
holtz-Reichenbach’ and ‘Poincaré’.
(1) ‘Helmholtz’ claims that ‘the empirically given solid body
realizes the concept of ‘distance’’ (Einstein, 1949b, 676–677):
geometry is verifiable, its propositions might be true or false. (2)
‘Poincaré’ objects that ‘the empirically given bodies are not rigid’
(Einstein, 1949b, 677) and consequently are not to be used as ‘the
embodiment of geometric intervals’ (Einstein, 1949b, 677): geo-
metry is not verifiable, its propositions are neither true nor false.
(3) ‘Helmholtz’ replies that one can realize the notion of a rigid
body anyway by taking ‘thermal volume-dependence, elasticity,
electro- and magneto-striction, etc., into consideration’ (Einstein,
1949b, 677). (4) However, in this way–‘Poincaré’ objects–one has
to make use of physical laws that describe the behavior of the rods
under this influence. Consequently, ‘not merely […] geometry but
[…] the entire system of physical laws’ (Einstein, 1949b, 676–677)
is to be compared with experience (cf. also Einstein (1954b, 91)).
Einstein seems to be repeating here the exact position of his
1921 lecture (and of several other minor texts that I have
mentioned above); however, he now more clearly separates the
pars destruens of Poincaré's argument from the pars construens,
which he famously attributes to an anonymous ‘non-Positivist’:
Non-Positivist: If, under the stated circumstances, you hold
distance to be a legitimate concept, how then is it with your
basic principle (meaning¼verifiability)? […] Do you not have
to admit that, in your sense of the word, no ‘meaning’ can be
attributed to the individual concepts and assertions of a physical
theory at all, and to the entire system only insofar as it makes
what is given in experience ‘intelligible?’ Why do the individual
concepts which occur in a theory require any specific justifica-
tion anyway, if they are only indispensable within the frame-
work of the logical structure of the theory, and the theory only
in its entirety validates itself? (Einstein, 1949b, 678; my
emphasis).
There has been a lot of speculation concerning the identity of
the non-Positivist.26 However, Einstein himself, or at least his later
self when he began to have an increasing faith in the power of
mathematics, seems to fit the description. He compared the work
of the theorist—no matter ‘how pure a ‘positivist’ he may fancy
himself’—to that of a ‘tamed metaphysicist’ (Einstein, 1950, 13),
who believes that the ‘logically simple is also the real’ (Einstein,
1950, 13). If we recall Lanczos’ distinction between positivists and
metaphysicians, mentioned above (see Section 5.1), one can
conjecture that Einstein chose the expression ‘non-positivist’ to
avoid the bolder one of ‘metaphysicist’ or ‘metaphysician’ that he
used on other occasions.
Whoever the non-positivist might be, it is clear that the
question at stake was again whether ‘individual statements’ of a
25 I thank Diana Kormos-Buchwald for providing me with the original letter.
26 Pierre Duhem has been the most obvious candidate (cf., e.g., Grünbaum
(1963/1973, 133)).
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theory can be directly compared with experience, or whether only
the simplicity and rigidity of the ‘theory as a whole’ are signs of its
correspondence to nature (Einstein, 1950, 13). This is the con-
ceptual backdrop against which the whole discussion about rods
and clocks should be understood. In November 1952 (the episode
is recounted in Howard, 1990, 13), Paul Oppenheim—a philosopher
known most for his work with Carl G. ‘Peter’ Hempel—took
Einstein to visit Rudolf Carnap. According to Carnap's recollections,
when he reminded him of Otto Neurath's famous ship argument
against the positivists, Einstein had a significant reaction: ‘there is
no rock bottom, Neurath's reconstruction of the ship afloat. With
that he emphatically agreed’ (quot. and tr. in Howard (1990, 13)).
5.3. The non-positivist vs. the positivist: Weyl vs. Pauli once again
In popular writings over the same decades (Weyl, 1932, 1934a,
1949a, 1968), Weyl defended a very similar epistemological view,
in spite of his skepticism toward the project of the unified field
theory. In the ‘Appendix F’ of the 1949 English-augmented
translation (Weyl, 1949b) of his 1927 philosophical monograph
(Weyl, 1927) Weyl articulated his position even more clearly. ‘The
rigid rods and the clocks by which Einstein measures the funda-
mental quantity ds2’, Weyl claims, are assumed to preserve their
lengths and periods ‘in the last instance because charge e and
mass m of the composing elementary particles are preserved’
(Weyl, 1949b, 288). However, ‘[t]he systematic theory […] pro-
ceeds in the opposite direction’ (Weyl, 1949b, 288). It starts with
the ds2 defined implicitly by the theory and then introduces a
‘primitive field quantity’ (Weyl, 1949b, 288) to which the Compton
wavelength h/mc of the particle stays in constant proportion. The
quantity h/mc furnishes an absolute length standard, which via the
spectral lines of atoms, can be used to ‘calibrate’ the ds2. In this
way ‘[t]he behavior of rods and clocks comes out as a remote
consequence of the fully developed theory’ (Weyl, 1949b, 288).
As we have seen, at the turn of the 1920s, Weyl (and
Eddington) had attempted to identify the field quantity in question
with the radius of the curvature of the world in his theory. Weyl
(in contrast to Eddington) had completely abandoned this
approach, forced by the discovery of the fundamental length
standard in quantum field theory (cf. Weyl, 1934b). However, as
he points out, this ‘does not essentially alter the basic relationship
just described’ (Weyl, 1949b, 288). The question then and now was
to explain ‘the most fundamental features in the nature of the
universe’ (Weyl, 1949b, 288; my emphasis), the composition of the
material world out ‘of one or a few units, existing in a huge number
of completely alike specimens’ (Weyl, 1949b, 288; my emphasis),
to explain how it happens that the ‘same particle with its definite
charge and mass […] occurs in the world in a large number of
copies’ (Weyl, 1949b, 288; my emphasis).
Classical physics could only deal with ‘preserving quantities’,
which are highly unstable. Their ‘initial value may be chosen
arbitrarily’, and ‘since perturbation can never entirely be elimi-
nated, deviations are apt to occur in the course of time’ (Weyl,
1949b, 288). According to Weyl, the only explanation of the
existence of particles of definite charge and mass was to imagine
that elementary particles behave like ‘adjusting quantities’, which
are not arbitrary and not perturbable; there must be some
mechanism that ‘enforces a definite value that is independent of
past history and hence reasserts itself after any disturbances and
any lapse of time as soon as the old conditions are restored’ (Weyl,
1949b, 288; cf. Fogel (2008, sec. 3.5)). If Mie's program had been
realized, Weyl goes on, then adjustment would have been
explained in the framework of classical field physics. The theory
would then possess only one, or at most a small number, of static
spherically-symmetric solutions of definite size. But Mie's program
failed. With the development of relativistic quantum mechanics
and quantum electrodynamics, the fields were subjected to a
‘second quantization’ (the classical field variables become quan-
tum operators), ‘a process by which one passes indeed from one to
an indeterminate number of equal particles’ (Weyl, 1949b, 289).
In this way, however, ‘equality is accounted for, yet the particular
values of charge and mass remain as unexplained as before’ (Weyl,
1949b, 289). To solve this problem one would have to derive from
the theory that the fine structure constant has a value nearly equal
to 1/137, just as one can derive from Euclidean geometry the value
of π.
Of course, Weyl had no intention of defending his 1918 unified
field theory, a theory in which he ‘no longer believe[s]’ (Weyl,
1951, 81; cf. also the addendum to the reprint of Weyl (1918b,
1968); published in Weyl (1956)). However, he still argues that the
theory confronted general relativity with a legitimate epistemo-
logical question: ‘the definition’ of the metric field with the help of
rods and clocks that actually exists can of course ‘only be regarded
as a temporary connection to the experience’ (Weyl, 1951, 81). The
theory should be able to account for the very behavior of those
material systems that are used to calibrate the measuring units:
‘the relations in which the measurement results which are read off
from those bodies stay to the fundamental quantities of the theory
must be derived’ from the laws of physics’ (Weyl, 1951, 81).
It is interesting to notice that the roles in the debate had not
changed significantly. In a note added to the 1958 English
translation (Pauli, 1958) of his encyclopedia article (Pauli 1921),
Pauli insisted again that, when he wrote the original text (see sec.
65 discussed in Section 3.4 above), he was already ‘very doubtful
regarding the possibility of explaining the atomism of matter, and
particularly of electric charge, with the help of classical concepts
of continuous fields alone’ (Pauli, 1958, 225, n. 23). Already at
that time he ‘felt rather strongly about the fundamental character
of the duality (or, as one says since 1927, complementarity)
between the measured field and the test body used as measuring
instrument’ (Pauli, 1958, 225, n. 23; my emphasis). The surprising
reference to Bohr's notion of ‘complementarity’ shows that Pauli
consciously denied the very possibility of applying a single
conceptual model to the theory and to the measuring instru-
ments that verify it.
In an address written in the year of his death—on the occasion
of what would have been Einstein's 80th birthday—Pauli seems to
attribute to this problem the same difficulties that Einstein had
encountered in trying to solve the problem of matter in the
context of classical field theory. In Einstein's theory ‘the duality
between the field and its means of measurement, although latently
present in today's quantum theory of fields,27 is conceptually not
clearly expressed’ (Pauli, 1959, 245; tr. Enz, 1973, 791, my empha-
sis). Precisely for this reason,’ [t]he relation of the applicability of
the ordinary space–time concept in the small with the properties
of the smallest physical objects, the so-called ‘elementary parti-
cles’ is not disclosed’ (Pauli, 1959, 245; tr. Enz, 1973, 791).
Einstein's project of a unified field theory was then considered
physically dubious, due to the same issue that had bothered the
19-year-old Pauli (see above, Section 2.4). This question does not
seem to have lost its importance when Pauli's life was drawing to a
close: ‘Einstein's life’, he wrote, ‘ended with a question [posed] to
the science of physics and with a behest for a synthesis to us’
(Pauli, 1959, 245; tr. Enz, 1973, 791).
27 Bohr and Rosenfeld (1933) showed that the measurability of the compo-
nents of the electromagnetic field by means of point charges “in the sense of
electron theory” (Bohr & Rosenfeld, 1933, 358) acquires new complexities in
quantum field theory. The measurement of the field values at points of space–
time (which is not an operator in a Hilbert space) would require an infinite amount
of energy.
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6. Conclusion
The entire discussion about the role of rods and clocks in
relativity theory seems to revolve around a very simple issue. If the
crucial discovery of relativity was that elapsed time, just like
traveled distance, is route-dependent, the empirical content of
relativity theory depends on the fact that the units of length and
time are not. Following Born, we have tentatively called this
assumption ‘the principle of the physical identity of the units of
measure’. The empirical content of both relativity theories seems
to depend entirely on the validity of such a principle, and it was
the problem of its validity that forced Einstein to call into question
the very relationship between a theory and the material devices
that serve to verify it.
It is fascinating that by the time of general relativity's second
flowering in the sixties, this very same issue returned in the very
same form, raising the very same epistemological concerns. In
1959, John Lighton Synge made a ‘plea for chronometry’ (Synge,
1959), insisting that clocks can determine the metric better than
measurements made by measuring rods, customarily employed
also in recent textbooks (e.g., Møller (1952)). Space-like separa-
tions can be measured indirectly using radar methods (Bondi,
1964). In this way, Synge hoped to ‘make general relativity more
operational than it has been hitherto’ (Synge, 1960, 105). Synge
attributed to Einstein the claim that physical quantities are defined
by the operations used to measure them (Synge, 1958, 7, 1960,
104–105). According to Synge this means that the ‘mathematical
observation’ (MO) of time (time, standard clock, ticking of stan-
dard clock) acquires a physical meaning if it can be connected with
the ‘natural observation’ (NO) of time (time atom, emission of
wave crests of radiation). Synge does not hide from his readers the
difficulties raised by the equation MO¼NO, but he is clearly
confident that the equation is realized with sufficient accuracy in
the case of time measurements. We have the ability to observe
virtually standard clocks, since physical entities (such a vibrating
atoms, etc.) exist in nature in which the intrinsic forces far exceed
any accelerating forces we can apply.
Which atoms should be chosen as standard clocks? ‘The answer
is that it does not matter, provided we use consistently the same
type of atom (all atoms of the same type are regarded as identical)
and the same pair of energy levels’ (Synge, 1960, 106; my
emphasis). In fact, ‘the only effect of changing from one clock to
another is to change the unit of time, the ratio of two units being a
universal constant’ (Synge, 1960, 107). Synge does not hide the
concern that’ in the present state of physics it is an impertinence
to look too closely into the private life of an atom’ (Synge, 1963,
34). However, what Synge called the ‘chronometric hypothesis’
could at least be regarded as reasonable: ‘if spectroscopy was a
complete chaos (equivalently if spectroscopy did not exist), one
would hesitate to speak of a standard clock. But spectroscopy
reveals a remarkable order in the behavior of what we may call
‘atomic clocks’’ (Synge, 1963, 34).
However, Synge's attitude was clearly regarded as epistemolo-
gically unsatisfying by other relativists. Kundt and Hoffman (1962),
along with Robert Marzke and John A. Wheeler (1964, relying on
Marzke, 1959) insisted that it was preferable to eliminate from the
process of measurement of the gravitational field all measuring
tools whose working mechanism is not described within general
relativity. When we use the red-orange spectral line emitted by
the krypton-86 isotope as a standard of length (which in 1960 was
chosen to replace the Paris platinum–iridium standard), this
definition depends on the physical constants which determine
the size of that atom, in particular on the fact that they are time-
independent (strong equivalence principle). However, the ratio of
physical constants, particularly the fine structure constant, may
change with time, for instance, as a consequence of the expansion
of the universe: ‘Then the ratio between the two standard meters
will also vary. We shall be faced with a serious difficulty. Which
meter is right? And, if one is wrong, how do we know that both
are not wrong?’ (Marzke & Wheeler, 1964, 48).
As Marzke and Wheeler pointed out—a space–time theory ‘in
and by itself’ should provide ‘its own means for defining intervals
of space and time’, without leaning ‘at all upon the atomic
constitution of matter to define a standard of length’ (Marzke &
Wheeler, 1964, 62). Marzke's method for the measurements of the
proper times between events in space–time involves the use of a
so-called ‘geodesic clock’. The latter consists of two mirrors
traveling along parallel paths in space–time with a light beam
reflecting back and forth between them. The number of reflections
yields a well-defined measurement of the space–time interval.
Marzke and Wheeler hoped that this standard would ‘supersede
the krypton-86 standard meter as well as the platinum–iridium
standard meter by a geometrodynamic standard meter’ (Marzke &
Wheeler, 1964, 62).
This hope was probably misplaced—the electromagnetic theory
of light is scale invariant, so that geodesic clocks cannot be used to
set a global definition of a unit of time. However, the epistemo-
logical ideal that inspired such attempts is clear. As James
Anderson put it, in general, a well-behaved physical theory must
satisfy a fundamental requirement: ‘it must contain a description
of all physical systems with which it purports to deal, including
those systems employed in the measurement process’ (Anderson,
1967, 139; cf. also Anderson (1964)). It is under the spell of this
epistemological ideal that several attempts were made to deter-
mine the metric structure of space–time, using less structured
entities, such as Castagnino (1971), and in particular Ehlers, Pirani,
and Schild (1972), (following the above-mentioned Weyl (1921b)).
However, it turned out to be impossible to revert to a full pseudo-
Riemannian geometry, with its global definition of the measuring
units, without avoiding quantum-theoretic considerations (Ehlers,
1973).
Relativists were once again facing the very same problems that
the pioneers of the theory had been concerned with the physical
problem of establishing a global definition of the units of measure,
and the philosophical issue of establishing to what extent this is
possible without abandoning the framework of relativity theory.
As Anderson put it with usual clarity, in a conclusion to a paper
written for John Stachel's 70th birthday, this is the fundamental
epistemological alternative in light of which the whole debate
about the role of rods and clocks in relativity theory should be
understood:
There are two positions one can take concerning the role of
measuring devices in a physical theory. One is that such devices
lie outside the province of the theory and their properties must
be postulated. Such a view is common in quantum mechanics,
in which measuring devices are held to be classical devices, and
leads to a number of problems associated with the so-called
measurement problem. The other position holds that measur-
ing devices are physical systems whose behavior must be
describable within the framework of the theory of the systems
they are designed to measure (Anderson, 2003, 280).
As we have seen, Einstein's vacillation between the treatment
of clocks as unstructured and structured entities should be
interpreted as the attempt to position himself between these
alternatives, which are historically well represented by Pauli
and Weyl.
Einstein's unease about the ‘sin’ of black-boxing rods and clocks
as simple, rather than treating them as complicated dynamical
systems, was precisely an attempt to give a balanced answer to a
philosophical question, which he jokingly compared to Pilate’s
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question: ‘What is truth?’ More humbly, this was the question of
whether a theory should describe its own means of verification or
whether this description should lie outside its domain. Einstein
did not consider this an either-or choice. He became aware that
testing a theory is a complex process, which might involve
preliminary stages that only provisionally secure the empirical
support of the theory, yet be rejected at later stages of its
development. Thus, it is only the process as a whole that can be
compared with experience in any meaningful way. Writing to his
lifelong friend Maurice Solovine in 1953, Einstein remarked that
the reduction of geometry to the behavior of rigid bodies is strictly
speaking untenable (perfectly rigid bodies do not exist in nature),
but at the same time it was inevitable from a didactic or heuristic
point of view: ‘Moral: unless one sins against logic one generally
gets nowhere; or one cannot construct a house or a bridge without
using a scaffold which is really not one of its basic parts’ (Einstein
to Solovine, 28 May 1953, AEA, 21–300, tr. in Einstein and Solovine
(1987, 147)).
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